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GLOBAL RATE SETTING:
A SOLUTION FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS?
Jorge L. Contreras*
Abstract: The commitment to license patents that are essential to technical interoperability
standards on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) is a fundamental
mechanism that enables standards to be developed collaboratively by groups of competitors.
Yet disagreements over FRAND royalty rates continue to bedevil participants in global
technology markets. Allegations of opportunistic hold-up and hold-out arise with increasing
frequency, spurring competition authorities to investigate and intervene in private standardsetting. And litigation regarding compliance with FRAND commitments has led courts around
the world to adjudicate FRAND royalty rates, often on a global basis, but using very different
methodologies and doctrinal approaches. The issues affecting the FRAND licensing system
can be summarized as deficiencies in transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness.
Together, these issues reduce the overall fairness and efficiency of the system and result in
excess administrative and transactional costs. This Article lays out a roadmap for the
establishment of a global FRAND rate-setting tribunal that promotes the tripartite goals of
transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness by determining the aggregate value of
patents covering a particular standard and allocating that value among individual patents and
patent holders. This tribunal is modeled on the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board and similar ratesetting agencies, though it is envisioned not as a governmental body but as an international
non-governmental organization. Such a tribunal should bring greater predictability and
stability to the technology development ecosystem while reducing inefficient litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Technical interoperability standards lie at the heart of some of the
largest litigation battles and corporate transactions in recent years.
Samsung’s patent infringement suits against Apple in the United States,
European Union, Korea, Japan, and elsewhere—fought at the height of
the global smart phone wars—turned on the use of patented 3G and 4G
wireless telecommunications technology.1 Recent takeover battles among
1. See Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition Disputes in North
America, Europe and Asia, KEIO U. J.L. POLITICS & SOC. 9–10 (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090
[https://perma.cc/KUQ2-TK8M]
[hereinafter Contreras, Global Standard Wars]; Hitomi Iwase & Takahiro Sugauchi, Apple v.
Samsung: Enforcing a Standards-Essential Patent After a FRAND Declaration, 2014 IP VALUE 102
(2014).
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Intel, Broadcom, Qualcomm, and NXP underlie a battle for dominance in
the market for standardized networking and communications chips.2
These standards, which range from simple physical compatibility
features such as the three-pronged electrical plug to hugely complex
wireless telecommunications protocols, enable products manufactured by
different vendors to interface seamlessly and automatically with one
another. Such standards, and the widespread product interoperability that
they enable, can promote innovation, reduce development costs, increase
consumer utility, and produce significant market efficiencies known as
“network effects.”3 The importance of standards continues to grow in
today’s interconnected global economy. Efforts are now under way to
develop future generations of mobile broadband communications
protocols known as “5G” and “6G,”4 as well as standards that will link a
vast array of devices embedded in personal accessories, medical devices,
vehicles, home appliances, and the built environment: the so-called
“Internet of Things.”5
Most of the thousands of technical standards implemented in products
today—from Wi-Fi to LTE to HTML—were developed by firms
collaborating within industry associations known as standardsdevelopment organizations (SDOs).6 As a result, these firms hold
hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of patents covering key
interoperability standards, particularly in the telecommunications and

2. See Danny Crichton, The Incredible Multi-Dimension Chess of Qualcomm vs. Broadcom,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 10, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/10/qualcomm-vs-broadcom/
[https://perma.cc/89XS-R3UW].
3. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 45–46 (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007)
[hereinafter DOJ-FTC ANTITRUST & IPR].
4. Sascha Segan, With 5G Still in the Works, 6G Is Already Taking Shape, PCMAG (Apr. 19, 2018,
12:25 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/360533/what-is-6g [https://perma.cc/DH5N-LEWE].
5. Ahmed Banafa, IoT Standardization and Implementation Challenges, IEEE INTERNET OF
THINGS (July 12, 2016), https://iot.ieee.org/newsletter/july-2016/iot-standardization-andimplementation-challenges.html [https://perma.cc/8TU3-5QW8].
6. SDOs encompass a wide range of organizations, from semi-official international bodies (e.g.,
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI)) to large private organizations (e.g., the IEEE Standards Association and
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)), to smaller groups often referred to as “consortia” that focus
on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the HDMI Forum and Bluetooth Special Interest Group).
See generally Brad Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT StandardsDevelopment Ecosystem, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 17 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). The term SDO is often
used interchangeably with the term SSO (standard setting organization). While fine distinctions can
be made, for purposes of this Article I treat these terms as synonymous.
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computing industries.7 In order to address concerns about the leverage that
holders of such patents may exert after a standard is widely adopted (socalled patent “hold-up”),8 SDOs have adopted policies requiring their
participants to license patents that are “essential” to their standards
(standards-essential patents or SEPs) on terms that are royalty-free or that
bear royalties that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(FRAND).9 Antitrust and competition authorities around the world have
recognized that commitments to license SEPs at rates that are no higher
than FRAND are important to standardization.10 The World Trade
Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement11 and
the SDO accreditation requirements of the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)12 both reflect the importance of such commitments.
Today, most SDOs around the world require some form of licensing
commitment for patents that are necessary to implement their standards,
and those commitments often require terms that are FRAND.13
7. See, e.g., Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using Declarations of
Declared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems of Technological Classification, 27 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 504, 521, tbl.7 (2018) (mapping number of declared patents to particular
standards—e.g., the 4G LTE standard is subject to 430 patent declarations by 65 different companies,
representing 45,279 different patents; the 3G UMTS standard is subject to 500 patent declarations by
63 different companies, representing 39,748 different patents); KNUT BLIND ET AL., STUDY ON THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS), FINAL REPORT 62
(2011).
8. See generally Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the
Literature, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, (C.
Bradford Biddle et al., eds. (forthcoming 2019)), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2902780 [https://perma.cc/S658-46HY].
9. SDOs that require royalty-free licensing of SEPs generally also require that non-royalty terms
be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. However, this Article uses the term FRAND to refer to
royalty-bearing licenses. In addition, following customary practice, the terms FRAND and RAND
(reasonable and nondiscriminatory) are used interchangeably. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL
PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 1 n.2 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ/PTO
POLICY STATEMENT] (noting equivalence of these terms).
10. See Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in the United States and
Europe, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 149.
11. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
12. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, 10–11 (2019) [hereinafter ANSI
Essential Requirements] (an SDO must conform to the ANSI Essential Requirements in order to be
recognized as a developer of American National Standards; these requirements include a patent policy
that requires either royalty-free or FRAND licensing of essential patent claims).
13. See Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7, at 521 tbl.7; RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A
STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING
ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 89 tbl.13 (2012), http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/
pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML2N-ZFFJ] (noting that of ten
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But despite the widespread imposition of FRAND commitments by
SDOs, there is little consensus regarding the methodology for determining
what royalty rates should be considered “fair” and “reasonable” in any
given instance.14 No SDO defines, even broadly, how to calculate royalty
rates that are FRAND,15 and many SDOs expressly disclaim any role in
establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating FRAND royalty rates.16 Though
some commentators (including the author) have argued that SDOs can and
should play a greater role in defining the nature and scope of their FRAND
commitments,17 concerns arising from antitrust law, complexity,

major SDOs studied, eight explicitly specify FRAND licensing as an option in their IPR policies);
Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION SEC. TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION,
KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. 123 & fig.2 (75% of the laptop computer standards studied were subject
to a RAND commitment and 22% were royalty-free); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights
and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002) (finding that of thirty-six
SDO patent policies, twenty-nine required, and three encouraged, FRAND licensing).
14. See, e.g., FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES
WITH COMPETITION 192 (2011) (“[T]he terms RAND and FRAND are vague and ill-defined.”);
Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 859 (2011) (noting that the “fair and reasonable” component of FRAND is
“often inherently ambiguous”); Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve
the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 3 ( 2013) (“SSOs
typically specify very little as to the meaning of ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable.’”); Doug Lichtman,
Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2010) (“It is something of an
outrage that the language of the RAND commitment offers so little guidance as to its proper
interpretation.”); Joseph S. Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 357 (2007) (reviewing earlier literature).
15. One SDO—the IEEE Standards Association—has attempted to offer some high-level
parameters for determining what rates satisfy its FRAND commitment. See IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N,
IEEE-SA
STANDARDS
BOARD
BYLAWS
§6
(2016),
http://standards.ieee.org/
develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9TC-QQ93] [hereinafter IEEE Policy].
Nevertheless, even this relatively modest effort at clarification has generated significant criticism and
pushback. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents,
104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 67–72 (2015).
16. See, e.g., IEEE Policy, supra note 15, at § 6.2 (“The IEEE is not responsible for . . . determining
whether any licensing terms or conditions . . . are reasonable or non-discriminatory.”); SCOTT O.
BRADNER & JORGE L. CONTRERAS, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IETF TECHNOLOGY 9 (2017) (“[IETF] will not make any explicit determination
that the assurance of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms or any other terms . . . has been fulfilled
in practice.”).
17. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not Be Set
by the Courts, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19 (2016) (arguing that SDOs, rather than courts, are
best-equipped to make FRAND royalty determinations); Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A
Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 78–87 (2013)
[hereinafter Contreras, Fixing FRAND] (proposing mechanism for SDO determination of FRAND
royalty rates); Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations:
Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 690 (2017) [hereinafter Contreras, Aggregated
Royalties] (proposing collective negotiation of aggregate royalty rates within SDOs); Kühn et al.,
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efficiency, cost, and member pressure have led some SDOs to prohibit
outright any discussion of royalties and other licensing terms at SDOsponsored activities.18
With little guidance from SDOs and regulatory authorities, SEP holders
and manufacturers of standardized products are left to determine FRAND
royalty rates in private negotiations. But given the complexity of these
transactions, the large sums at stake, and the legal uncertainty that
pervades this area, an increasing number of disputes have arisen regarding
the appropriate level of FRAND royalty rates. It is now routine for
manufacturers of standardized products to claim that SEP holders seek
royalties that are in excess of FRAND limits and are thereby violating
their FRAND commitments. By the same token, it has become
commonplace for SEP holders to claim that manufacturers are dragging
their feet in negotiations, intentionally stalling so as to avoid paying
royalties that are fair and reasonable (a practice referred to as “holdout”
or “reverse hold-up”). In both types of cases, courts around the world have
been called upon to adjudicate the level of royalties that SEP holders can
validly charge.19 Not surprisingly, these disputes are costly, unpredictable,
and disruptive to the market.
The above considerations can be distilled into three key deficiencies
that most significantly impact the efficient and predictable determination
of FRAND royalty rates, both privately and through adjudication: lack of
transparency, lack of consistency, and lack of comprehensiveness.
Transparency. FRAND royalty rates must, by their terms, be nondiscriminatory, meaning that, at least with respect to similarly-situated
licensees, rates should be comparable if not identical.20 But because
FRAND royalty negotiations and the resulting license agreements are
typically subject to strict confidentiality obligations, manufacturers have

supra note 14, at 3 (“SSOs can substantially reduce the problem of hold-up and litigation in this sector
by reforming their IPR policies.”).
18. See, e.g., IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD OPERATIONS MANUAL
§ 5.3.10.2 (2015) (“No discussions or other communications regarding the following topics shall
occur during . . . duly authorized IEEE-SA standards-development technical activities: . . . the
essentiality, interpretation, or validity of patent claims; specific patent license terms or other
intellectual property rights . . . .”); see also Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17, at 51–52
(discussing reasons for prohibitions); Lemley, supra note 13, at 1965 (observing that such restrictions
are often intended to shield SDOs from antitrust liability).
19. See generally CHRYSSOULA PENTHEROUDAKIS & JUSTUS A. BARON, LICENSING TERMS OF
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF CASES, JRC Science for Policy
Report EUR 28302 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., 2017) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world).
20. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying discussion of non-discrimination requirements.
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little visibility into the rates offered by SEP holders to others.21 Likewise,
when parties resolve their FRAND disputes through binding arbitration,
the results are typically not disclosed to the public.22 Accordingly, aside
from a few published judicial opinions, there is a paucity of publicly
available information regarding FRAND royalty rates.23 Thus,
manufacturers have few means short of litigation discovery by which they
can compare a SEP holder’s royalty rates or validate whether a SEP holder
has complied with its obligation to grant licenses on non-discriminatory
terms.24
Consistency. Parties ordering their affairs depend on consistent rulings
and legal interpretations from courts, and such consistency is particularly
important when significant investments and business decisions will
depend on a party’s assessment of its legal rights.25 But as the number of
courts deciding FRAND-related cases has increased, so has disagreement
over the interpretation of FRAND commitments.26 And nowhere is this
disagreement more pronounced than in the methodology for computing
FRAND royalties. As discussed in Section I.A, there are more than a
dozen points of serious divergence among courts and other adjudicatory

21. See Mark R. Patterson, Confidentiality in Patent Dispute Resolution: Antitrust Implications, 93
WASH. L. REV. 827 (2018) (raising antitrust concerns arising from lack of transparency in FRAND
licensing transactions).
22. See Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating
Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 23, 39–41 (discussing confidentiality in
FRAND arbitration); Yoonhee Kim, Lifting Confidentiality of FRAND Royalties in SEP Arbitration,
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
23. See generally JORGE L. CONTRERAS ET AL., STUDY PROPOSAL—COMMERCIAL PATENT
LICENSING
DATA
(2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755706
[https://perma.cc/WL7H-L6NS] (identifying lack of public licensing data as an issue both for firms
and courts).
24. Cf. Gilbert, supra note 14, at 870 (underscoring the importance of non-discrimination
commitments to the correct functioning of FRAND obligations).
25. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, New York] (discussing parties’
preference for “certainty and predictability” in transactions).
26. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Private Law, Conflict Of Laws, and a Lex Mercatoria of
Standards-Development Organizations, 2019 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 245, 253 (2019) [hereinafter
Contreras, Lex Mercatoria] (“The application of specific national laws and modes of legal
interpretation to already complex and lengthy SDO policies has introduced an additional level of
unpredictability and uncertainty to the interpretation of SDO policies, particularly surrounding
FRAND commitments.”); Jyh-An Lee & Dicky Tsang, Unfriendly Choice of Law in FRAND
(working paper, presented at IP Scholars Conference, Aug. 2018) (noting national inconsistencies in
interpretation of FRAND commitments among courts in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan,
Korea, China and Germany); PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON, supra note 19 (cataloging issues and
disputes in cases around the world).
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bodies with respect to the methods of calculating FRAND royalty rates.
These methods can vary dramatically from court to court and case to case,
even for patents covering the same standard and for cases within the same
jurisdiction.27 This degree of judicial discord, coupled with the lack of
transparency noted above, creates uncertainty in the marketplace, as there
is no definitive benchmark that parties can use to determine whether the
rates being offered in private negotiations are reasonable or not. What is
more, as discussed in Section I.C, national courts have become
increasingly emboldened to determine FRAND rates at a global level.28
Thus, the methodological choices made by any given court take on even
greater significance, as they may be applied not only by the court hearing
a dispute but also around the world.
Comprehensiveness. As noted above, many widely adopted standards
are covered by hundreds or thousands of patents.29 Yet in litigation, the
royalty due to every patent holder is determined individually, without
reference to the other patents covering the same standard or product. In
most cases, only one patent holder out of dozens presents arguments to
the court, generally over emphasizing the value of its own patents above
the others.30 Thus, even if such a royalty might meet some test of
27. See Ryan Davis, 4 Things to Know About the Latest FRAND Rate-Setting Case, LAW360 (Jan.
4, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/998063/4-things-to-know-about-the-latestfrand-rate-setting-case [http://perma.cc/M8K4-4JS9] (quoting attorney David Long, who noted “[w]e
haven’t had any U.S. court consistently apply the same method”); Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L.
Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things, 36 REV.
LITIG. 285, 296 (2017) (discussing inconsistency in judicial determinations of FRAND royalties for
patents covering Wi-Fi standard). See generally Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New
Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 317, 326 (1984) (noting the general tendency of national courts to interpret the same
contractual provisions in different ways).
28. Recent cases in which courts have sought to determine FRAND rates at a global level include
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018) (Eng.), and TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV 14–341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15–2370 JVS(DFMx), 2017
WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30. See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 427 (2016) (“When thousands of patents or other inputs are involved in
the same device, judges and juries consistently and systematically overemphasize the value of the
single patent (or patents) at issue as compared to all the other inputs.”); Bartlett & Contreras, supra
note 27, at 304–05 (comparing judicial tendency to view all patents as “above average” to Garrison
Keillor’s Lake Wobegon, “where all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the
children are above average” (quoting The News from Lake Wobegon, A Prairie Home Companion
(1974–2016))); Bernard Chao & Roderick O’Dorisio, Saliency, Anchors, and Frames: A
Multicomponent Damages Experiment 1 (U. of Denv. Sturm Coll. of Law. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 19-03, 2018) (finding that fact finders tend to over-value the first plaintiff to trial
when apportioning damages among multiple patent holders).
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reasonableness if considered in isolation, it is not likely to be reasonable
when combined with many other independently-calculated royalties
applied to the same product. This is the well-known issue of royalty
“stacking”.31 In reality, despite the inherently bilateral, adversarial nature
of litigation, the determination of a FRAND royalty is not strictly a
bilateral matter. Rather, it must involve consideration of the other patented
and unpatented technologies embodied in the standardized technology, as
the royalty determination made in one case necessarily affects the level of
royalties in many other cases. Thus, FRAND royalty determinations,
particularly when they relate to standards covered by diversified patent
holdings, should be comprehensive, taking into account the totality of
patents and technologies involved in the relevant standard or product.32
These three deficiencies in the FRAND licensing system—
transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness—impact the market in
two principal ways. First, they negatively affect the overall fairness and
accuracy of the system by producing results that could favor some market
participants over others in a manner that arguably violates the express
commitment to grant licenses on terms that are FRAND. Uncertainty
regarding the level of FRAND royalty rates makes it more difficult for
manufacturers to predict the cost of entering a market characterized by
broad product interoperability.
Second, the system imposes excess transaction costs through
duplicative negotiation and litigation both among different parties
disputing rates over the same patents and among the same parties
litigating in different jurisdictions. As reported in recent cases,
negotiations over FRAND licenses routinely take years and often result in
an impasse that can be resolved only through litigation.33 Such transaction
costs could deter or prevent small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from
entering the market and increase costs for larger firms, which in turn could
lead to reduced consumer choice and higher consumer prices. The result

31. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“If companies are
forced to pay royalties to all [patent] holders, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may
become excessive in the aggregate.”).
32. In addition, separate judicial proceedings addressing similar legal and factual issues are
inherently inefficient, as each judge in each case must separately be educated about the relevant
industry, technology, commitments and valuation methodologies. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 1293, 1317 (1996) (observing high transaction costs involved in judicial determination of
copyright licensing rates).
33. See, e.g., Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2017 WL 6611635 (discussing in the Memorandum
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law how negotiations over 3G/4G patent license took over
six years and ultimately ended in litigation).
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could undermine the benefits that industry-wide, non-discriminatory
licensing of SEPs is intended to achieve. These concerns are particularly
worthy of attention today given the advent of important new technologies,
such as broadband 5G/6G data transmission and the Internet of Things
that will be heavily dependent on standardization.34
This Article adopts the perspective of a social planner seeking to
minimize unfairness/inaccuracy and administrative inefficiency in
FRAND licensing so as to maximize overall social welfare. As such, the
proposals made herein are not aimed either at achieving any particular
distribution of revenue between SEP holders and manufacturers of
standardized products or at minimizing consumer prices. Instead, it has
the relatively modest aspiration of reducing unnecessary transaction costs
while ensuring the fair and consistent treatment of all parties.35
To do so, the tripartite issues of transparency, consistency, and
comprehensiveness in the FRAND licensing system must be addressed.
That is, an open and transparent process should be used both to ensure
that SEP holders are treating licensees in a non-discriminatory fashion and
to provide reliable cost information to potential market entrants. FRAND
rates should be determined in a consistent manner, at least for all patents
covering a particular standard, but preferably for all standards generally.
And finally, the determination of FRAND royalties should be
comprehensive, taking into account all pertinent information regarding
the patents covering the relevant standard and not just the patents that may
be held by a party to a particular lawsuit.
Over the past decade, proposals for increasing transparency in
standard-setting have included, among others, requirements that SEP
holders disclose their licensing rates prior to adoption of a standard (socalled ex ante disclosure),36 a requirement that SEP holders offer a simple
34. See EUR. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: SETTING OUT
THE EU APPROACH TO STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 2 (2017) [hereinafter EC SEP COMMC’N];
Fiona S. Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to
Contribution? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21678, 2015).
35. This balance is important. Simply minimizing transaction costs could be achieved, for example,
by requiring that all SEPs be licensed at zero royalty rates. In fact, a number of SDOs have adopted
precisely such policies. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standards and the
Internet, 93 DENVER L. REV. 855 (2016) (discussing royalty-free licensing policies at IETF and W3C
and contrasting with SDOs adopting FRAND policies). Yet “one size does not fit all,” and in some
technology areas a royalty-free licensing regime might not produce desired levels of innovation and
technology contribution. Thus, FRAND licensing cannot be ruled out entirely.
36. PIERRE RÉGIBEAU ET AL., TRANSPARENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY OF SSO-BASED
STANDARDIZATION AND SEP LICENSING: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 31, 46 (2016);
Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an
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“cash only” price for licensing their SEPs,37 greater verification of the
essentiality of patents declared to be SEPs,38 and increasing available
public information about disclosures made to SDOs.39 But none of these
proposals has been adopted by any major SDOs. Likewise, some courts
have taken steps toward addressing the issue of comprehensiveness.
Specifically, a number of courts have used so-called “top down”
approaches to FRAND royalty calculation in which an aggregate royalty
for all patents covering a particular standard is first determined and then
allocated among individual patent holders. This approach, which is
discussed in greater detail in Section I.A and for which the author has
advocated,40 is an important step toward addressing comprehensiveness
issues in FRAND rate determination but does not solve the problems of
lack of transparency or consistency. Thus, in order to address the most
challenging issues facing the standardization system today, a tripartite
approach that simultaneously improves transparency, consistency, and
comprehensiveness together is needed.
In prior work, the author has proposed that these goals may be achieved
through the procedural litigation mechanism of interpleader to aggregate
all claims pertaining to royalties on a single standard into a single, massive
judicial proceeding.41 The author has also proposed that SDOs could
achieve these goals through private ordering, by facilitating an open
agreement among SEP holders and manufacturers on aggregate royalty

Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163 (2013) [hereinafter Contreras, Ex Ante] (describing ex ante
policies adopted and proposed at several SDOs).
37. ALBERT A. FOER & SANDEEP VAHEESAN, REQUEST FOR JOINT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE
PATENT POLICIES OF STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: PETITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 16–17 (May 23, 2013), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Request-for-Joint-Enforcement-Guidelines-on-the-Patent-Policies-of-StandardSetting-Organizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS9P-YXLR] (“Licensees should have the option of licensing
individual SEPs on a cash-only basis.”); Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 4 (“The F/RAND dispute resolution
process should require that the licensor specify a cash price for its SEPs as an alternative to other pricing
arrangements to aid in evaluation of the proposed license terms by the third party.”).
38. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 7 (observing that SDOs make no validation of SEP
declarations, potentially leading to over-declaration); RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, 62, 86
(noting the significant problem of “over-declaration” of SEPs).
39. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 3; RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, 62, 86; NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 80
(Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (“SSOs should to [sic]
consider measures to increase the quality and accuracy of disclosure data.”).
40. See Contreras, Aggregate Royalties, supra note 17.
41. Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27 (proposing judicial interpleader process for resolving
multiparty FRAND royalty determinations).
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rates for particular standards.42 Other commentators have likewise made
a range of reasonable proposals seeking to address these issues with the
current FRAND licensing system.43 Even the leaders of the largest patent
offices in the world have made calls for greater consistency in addressing
SEP disputes.44 Yet it does not appear that a critical mass of SDOs and
SDO participants are ready to implement any of these proposals.45
Commercial ventures, too, have sought to solve these problems through
the pooling of patents essential to key standards, yet these efforts have
either failed or have not yet attracted significant market participation.46
This Article offers a new option for determining FRAND royalty rates
in a transparent, consistent, and comprehensive manner: the establishment
of a non-governmental, global FRAND rate-setting tribunal (referred to
herein as the “FRAND Tribunal”).47 Such a tribunal could contribute to
alleviating the uncertainty and litigation burden currently associated with
FRAND licensing.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four principal parts. Part I
summarizes current disputes regarding the calculation of FRAND
royalties, both in the literature and in judicial determinations, and
highlights how the divergent approaches taken by courts in resolving these
disputes has led to significant inconsistency in this area. Part I concludes
42. See Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17 (proposing SDO-based “pseudo-pool” approach
to setting aggregate FRAND royalty rates); see also Contreras, Aggregated Royalties, supra note 17
(refining earlier proposal).
43. See, e.g., Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 3–5 (proposing various IPR policies to be implemented
by SSOs to limit patent holdup); Mark Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards
(and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 155–67 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (suggesting
five steps for SSOs to take and five changes to the law that could prevent patent holdup); Marc
Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 35 TELECOM.
POL’Y 1010, 1014–15 (2011) (proposing to replace RAND policies with a policy of Non-Assertion
After Specified Time (NAAST)).
44. See Brian Yap, European Patent Official Says Disputes Need Multilateral Solutions, 95
PATENT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 12 (2018).
45. For a discussion of commercial factors that have stymied policy change in this area, see
Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36, at 206–08 (considering rationales for failure of SDOs to adopt ex
ante disclosure policies).
46. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing
unsuccessful VIA licensing pool for Wi-Fi patents); Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure:
IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419 (2016)
(describing IPXI, an effort to pool and securitize license rights for the Wi-Fi standard); How it Works:
Marketplace, AVANCI, http://avanci.com/marketplace/ [https://perma.cc/8L24-CN4J] (describing
pooled licensing of wireless WLAN SEPs for industries such as automotive).
47. The instant proposal is not simply to submit FRAND disputes to binding bilateral arbitration.
The use of arbitration to resolve FRAND disputes has been proposed before. See infra Section II.A.
Rather, this Article proposes a framework and tribunal for resolving FRAND disputes on a global
multilateral basis, involving all interested parties: rate-setting rather than bilateral arbitration.
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with a discussion of the international “race to the bottom” that could
emerge as national courts increasingly determine FRAND royalty rates on
a global basis. Part II describes a range of antecedents for the proposed
rate-setting mechanism, including other arbitral bodies and rate-setting
tribunals, as well as initial efforts made to resolve FRAND disputes
through alternative dispute resolution. Part III introduces the proposed
FRAND rate-setting tribunal and summarizes its principal features.
I.

FRAND ROYALTIES TODAY

There are numerous areas of disagreement regarding the calculation of
FRAND royalties among litigants and courts around the world. First,
Section I.A discusses two different fundamental approaches to calculating
an appropriate FRAND royalties. Second, Section I.B describes additional
factors with different interpretations. Section I.C analyses additional
complications in setting worldwide royalty rates. As observed by the
English Court of Appeals in its characteristically understated manner, “the
approaches of courts around the world to the assessment of royalties under
a worldwide [FRAND] licence are not at present wholly aligned.”48 To
illustrate the current degree of intra-jurisdictional discord, this Part
describes some of the judicial disagreements over FRAND royalty
calculation in greater detail.49
A.

FRAND Rate Calculation Approaches: Top-Down Versus BottomUp

Generally speaking, courts have adopted two fundamental approaches
to calculating the FRAND royalty to be charged by a SEP holder to the
manufacturer of a standardized product. Under a “bottom up” approach,
the FRAND royalty is determined using a conventional “reasonable
royalty” patent damages analysis in which the value of the SEP holder’s
patents is assessed independently of other patents that may cover the
infringing product, and the total royalty burden on the relevant standard
and product emerge only as the sum of its individual components in
separate cases. In contrast, under a “top down” approach, the aggregate
royalty for all SEPs covering a particular standard is first calculated, after
which an appropriate portion is allocated to the claiming SEP holder. Each
of these approaches is discussed in greater detail below.
48. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 ¶ 83.
49. The discussion in this Section is not intended to be comprehensive but only to provide several
examples of current disagreements over FRAND royalty calculation around the world. For a more
comprehensive discussion, see Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1 and
PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON, supra note 19.

07 - Contreras (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:58 PM

714

[Vol. 94:701

1.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Bottom-Up Approach

Bottom-up royalty calculations are derived from traditional patent
damages analysis. In the United States, a patent holder asserting patents
against an infringer is entitled to prove the value of its patents in order to
establish “reasonable royalty” damages.50 For the past several decades,
the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in the United States has
generally followed the fifteen-factor framework established in GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.51 The factors contributing to the
reasonable royalty calculation under Georgia-Pacific include the rates
paid by the licensee for similar patents, whether the license is exclusive
or non-exclusive, whether the licensor has a policy of limiting the
licensing of its patents, the rates charged by the licensor to other licensees
of the same patents (“comparable” licenses), the competitive relationship
between licensor and licensee, and the opinions of qualified experts.52
However, because the Georgia-Pacific framework assumes that a
patent holder and an alleged infringer have no pre-existing relationship or
duty toward one another, many of the factors considered in this analysis
are inapplicable to cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs, in which
the SEP holder has an affirmative obligation to grant licenses to
implementers of the standard. Accordingly, in Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc.,53 the district court expressly modified twelve of the fifteen
Georgia-Pacific factors to align them more closely with the relationship
between a SEP holder and the manufacturer of a standardized product.54
Likewise, in Ericsson v. D-Link,55 the Federal Circuit recognized several
instances in which the Georgia-Pacific factors were both irrelevant and
inconsistent with the relationship between parties operating under a
FRAND commitment.56 It thus approved the lower court’s modification
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (“[T]he court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use the infringer
made of the invention.”).
51. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
52. Id.
53. No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *16–17 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
54. Id. at *57–65 (modifying Georgia-Pacific factors 1, 4–13, 15); see also Norman V. Siebrasse
& Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra
note 6, at 365; Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and other
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447, 1483–85 (2015) (analyzing court’s reasoning).
55. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
56. Id. at 1229–30 (criticizing district court’s use of Georgia-Pacific factors 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10). For
a more detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in this regard, see J. Gregory Sidak,
Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, And Comparable Licenses after Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL.
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of these factors, but declined to require any particular modifications in
other cases involving FRAND commitments, leaving lower courts and,
potentially, juries to make these assessments on a case-by-case basis.
The incremental nature of judicial decision making has led to a
significant degree of divergence in FRAND royalty rate determinations,
even when patents covering the same features of the same standard are at
issue. For example, between 2013 and 2014 five different U.S. district
courts calculated royalties for a total of thirty-five SEPs covering Wi-Fi
standards, each using a slightly different methodology.57 The aggregate
royalty for these thirty-five patents amounted to approximately 4.5% of
the total sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router.58 Yet it has been
estimated that there are approximately 3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi
standard,59 nearly one hundred times the number subject to adjudication.
Were the royalty for each of these patents to be calculated in a similarly
uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a WiFi router could easily surpass the product’s total selling price by at least
an order of magnitude. This is a prime example of how inconsistent and
non-comprehensive bottom-up approaches to FRAND royalty calculation
can lead to royalty stacking.60
2.

Top-Down Approach

Given the shortcomings of bottom-up FRAND royalty calculations and
the threat of royalty stacking when multiple firms hold SEPs covering a
single standard,61 commentators, courts, and policy makers have become
increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the aggregate
L. REV. 1809, 1854–62 (critiquing Federal Circuit reasoning); Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 54, at
374; Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 54, at 1485–86.
57. Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27, at 296 tbl.2.
58. Id.
59. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061,
at *179–80 (N.D. Ill. Sept 27, 2013) (“[T]he court determines that the PA Report’s number of
approximately 3000 is a credible account of the number of potentially standard-essential patents.”).
60. See supra note 31. Some authors have observed that significant royalty stacking does not appear
to have occurred in practice in some industries characterized by the presence of large numbers of
SEPs. See, e.g., Jonathan Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1313, 1356–61 (2017); Alexander Galetovic et al., Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the
World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1527 (2017). These scholars offer several
possible reasons that royalty stacking has not manifested itself in these industries, a full discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this Article. However, suffice it to say that the theoretical threat of
stacking remains and is likely enhanced in new technology markets such as the Internet of Things
(IoT) in which an increasing number of market entrants participate.
61. See, e.g., Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7 (upwards of sixty different firms have declared
patents essential to widely adopted wireless telecommunications standards).
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royalty burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties
owed to any particular patent holder. Thus, as the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois explained in In re Innovatio IP Ventures,62
“the determination of a [F]RAND royalty must address the risk of royalty
stacking by considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other
[SEP] holders made royalty demands of the implementer.”63 The
European Commission echoed this sentiment in its 2017 Communication
on SEPs, stating that “an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation.
Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the
standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology.”64
Royalty calculation methodologies that take into account aggregate
royalty levels can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they
look first to the overall level of royalties associated with a standard and
then allocate a portion of the total to individual SEP holders. Top-down
approaches implicitly recognize that when multiple patents cover a single
standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder will necessarily affect the
rates that the other SEP holders can charge a single manufacturer.65
Several courts around the world have attempted to determine FRAND
royalty rates using a top-down methodology, including the court in
Innovatio, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court in Samsung v.
Apple Japan,66 the U.K. High Court of Justice (Patents) in
Unwired Planet v. Huawei,67 and the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California in TCL Communications v. Ericsson.68 In each of
these cases, the court first sought to determine the aggregate royalty rate
that should be attributed to all patents covering a particular standard and
then allocated an appropriate portion to the SEPs in suit.69 The court in
TCL v. Ericsson identifies the following merits of a top-down approach:

62. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 (N.D. Ill. Sept 27, 2013).
63. Id. at *66 (internal quotes omitted).
64. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 7.
65. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 2011 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup] (“[T]he royalty rate negotiated by
one patent holder is affected by the rates the downstream firm pays to other patent holders, so a proper
analysis must account for the joint determination of all the royalty rates.”).
66. Chiteki Zaisan Koto Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 16, 2014, 2013 (Ne) 10043
(Japan).
67. [2017] EWHC (Ch) 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018)
(Eng.).
68. Nos. SACV 14–341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15–2370 JVS(DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2017).
69. For a more detailed discussion of the use of top-down approaches in these cases, see Contreras,
Aggregate Royalties, supra note 17.
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While this approach is not perfect, it has merit because: (1) it
relies on statements that Ericsson and other SEP owners made to
induce people to adopt and invest in each standard when the risk
of hold-up was low; (2) these statements were made before the
standard was adopted, providing the SEP owners with incentive
to be reasonable with their overall expectations and greatly
reducing the risk of hold-up and royalty stacking; (3) Ericsson
was a licensor and licensee, giving it stronger incentive to be fair
and reasonable with its own estimate; (4) Ericsson still stands by
this methodology . . . ; and (5) it at least provides the ceiling for a
FRAND rate, because increasing the royalty rate after the
standard has been adopted, without showing that the increase is
due to additions to the standard, is the definition of hold-up. Use
of an aggregate figure in fact hews to the principle of setting rates
to reflect Ericsson’s own estimate of the total value the licensed
technology contributed to the product.70
But despite the appeal of top-down FRAND royalty calculation
methodologies, reliable and consistent methods for determining the
aggregate royalty burden on a particular standard have proven difficult to
implement. A principal reason is the lack of transparency in FRAND
transactions, which prevents any given licensee from knowing precisely
what terms a SEP holder has offered to other licensees and which prevents
courts from learning the rates charged by SEP holders that are not before
them in a particular matter.71 Faced with this challenge, courts using topdown methodologies have been forced to rely upon less reliable data. For
example, in three of the four cases mentioned above,72 the court utilized a
combination of public statements by SEP holders and other industry
participants coupled with other market factors to determine the aggregate
royalty burden for a particular standard. In Unwired Planet, the court cited
eight different press releases and public statements in which industry
participants estimated either the total royalty burden for the relevant
standards or their share of SEPs covering those standards.73 In some cases,

70. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., at *14.
71. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 66–68.
73. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [264(i)–(vii)]
(Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018). Similar statements were recently
relied upon by the parties in TCL’s Redacted Trial Brief at 8, TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx), CV 15-02370 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
1, 2017) [hereinafter TCL Trial Brief].
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these rates were no more than ballpark estimates74 that the court found to
be “obviously self-serving.”75 Similar evidence was utilized by the
Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v. Apple Japan, which established an
aggregate baseline royalty rate of 5% for a standard—a figure derived
from public statements and informal agreements among industry
participants.76
This weakness in recent applications of the top-down approach to
FRAND royalty calculation is compounded by the incremental nature of
current FRAND litigation. Thus, just as with bottom-up approaches,
courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates are presented with evidence
from only one SEP holder, rather than from the entire market, making it
likely that their allocation of royalties to particular SEP holders will be
inconsistent.77 Absent the introduction of multi-party litigation
mechanisms such as interpleader,78 this incremental approach is an
unavoidable feature of private litigation. This is one of the reasons that
this Article proposes an alternative to conventional litigation for the
determination of FRAND royalty rates.
B.

Other FRAND Rate Issues

In addition to the choice between top-down and bottom-up royalty
calculation methodologies, there are a number of additional controversies
surrounding the calculation of FRAND royalties. For example, there is
significant debate regarding the correct royalty “base” (the amount by
which a percentage royalty is multiplied to derive the actual amount owed
to the patent holder) for calculating FRAND royalties. Two competing
approaches have emerged from the case law: the “smallest salable patent
practicing unit” (SSPPU) approach, in which the royalty rate is multiplied
by the sale price of the smallest infringing component that is sold as a

74. For example, in one public statement by “wireless industry leaders,” the maximum reasonable
aggregate royalty level for the 4G LTE standard should be a “single-digit percentage of the sales
price.” Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [264(i)]. Another press release by Huawei
anticipated “a low single-digit percentage of sales prices as a reasonable maximum aggregate royalty
rate applicable to end-user devices.” Id. at ¶ 264(iii).
75. Id. at ¶ 269.
76. Apple Japan, 2013 (Ne) 10043 at 131 (with respect to particular products, the baseline rate was
discounted by a factor corresponding to the value contributed by the standard to the product).
77. See, e.g., Fei Deng et al., Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates,
32 ANTITRUST 47, 49 (2018) (comparing differing top-down methodologies in Unwired Planet [2017]
EWHC (Pat) 711 [1] and TCL, Case No. SACV14-341 JVS, at 1).
78. See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27.
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stand-alone unit (e.g., a chip or module),79 and the “entire market value
rule” (EMVR), in which the royalty is based on the value of the complete
end product implementing the patented feature (e.g., a smart phone,
computer, or game player).80 Assuming that the royalty rate remains
constant, the choice between the SSPPU and the EMVR approaches could
yield significantly different returns to the patent holder. There is now a
growing literature debating the relative merits of these differing
approaches to FRAND royalty calculation,81 and at least one major SDO
has suggested that its participants consider SSPPU when negotiating
FRAND royalty rates.82
Another area of disagreement arises with respect to the use of
comparable license agreements as evidence supporting the determination
of FRAND royalty rates. Some commentators support the use of
comparable licenses as the best available evidence of royalty rates that the
parties would have agreed to in a hypothetical negotiation.83 Courts have
likewise taken differing approaches to the comparable license agreements
that will be admitted into evidence when calculating FRAND royalty
rates, ranging from the admission of licenses with different parties and
patent pools84 to licenses granted solely by the SEP holder in suit under
the same patent portfolio.85
Another contentious issue arises when a portion of the total value of an
infringing product is apportioned to a particular patent holder and the
product is covered by multiple patents. It is well-established that
79. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 698 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (first
enunciating the SSPPU test).
80. See Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing EMVR and SSPPU
approaches in SEP cases).
81. See David Kappos & Paul R. Michel, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit:
Observations on its Origins, Development, and Future, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2017);
Nicolas Petit, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit Experiment, General Purpose
Technologies and the Coase Theorem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (2017); J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper
Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 989 (2014); Siebrasse & Cotter,
supra note 54, at 375–77.
82. See IEEE Policy, supra note 15, at § 6.1; Business Review Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen. to Michael L. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015) (approving
IEEE policy amendments).
83. See Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex,
Multi-Patent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 763 (2011); Sidak, supra note
56; Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution
Should Courts Apply? (Hoover Inst. Working Group, Working Paper No. 19001, 2019).
84. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042–45 (9th Cir. 2015).
85. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [1]; see also Deng et
al., supra note 77, at 48 (comparing differing methodologies used to assess comparable licenses in
Unwired Planet v. Huawei and TCL v. Ericsson).
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“reasonable royalty” patent damages should be “based on the incremental
value that the patented invention adds to the end product.”86 Determining
this incremental value requires a court to determine the fraction of the
overall product value that is contributed by the patented feature in view
of all the other patented and unpatented features of the product. This
analysis is often referred to as “apportionment.”87 Aside from the
difficulty of determining the overall value that a standard contributes to a
particular product, the court must also determine how valuable one patent
covering a standard is in comparison to the others. Individual patents and
groups of patents have been valued in litigation using a range of methods
including citation count, cost recovery, real option value, discounted cash
flow, and comparison to comparable licenses.88 But in many cases where
multiple patents cover a single standard or product, royalties are allocated
on the basis of one-patent-one-share (sometimes referred to as numerical
proportionality).89 While this last approach may seem unsophisticated in
comparison to those better informed by economic analysis, it is frequently
adopted by parties and courts during litigation. As explained by the lower
court in Unwired Planet, “some sort of patent counting is the only
practical approach at least for a portfolio of any size. Trying to evaluate
the importance of individual inventions becomes disproportionate very
quickly.”90

86. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
87. See id. at 1226–28.
88. See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 41–54 (2003); Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27, at 308–09 (collecting literature);
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 175 n.52 (2018)
(analyzing various methodologies adopted in recent SEP cases); Geradin & Layne-Farrar, supra note
83, at 781–84; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1059 (2005); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive
Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 736–43 (2008);
Patrick H. Sullivan, Standardising IP Valuations: Whether, What and How, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 30 (noting that over fifty different methods for valuing IP are currently in use);
David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 131–
39 (2014); Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation Methods with
Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Further Research (Judge Inst., Working
Paper No. 21/97, 1997), http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mast0140/EJWP0599.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9F2827G].
89. See Menno Treffers, The Royalty Rate for a Subset of Standard Essential Patents – What Is
Reasonable?, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/22/royalty-ratestandard-essential-patents/id=69045/ [https://perma.cc/XWH6-Z9JQ]; Bartlett & Contreras, supra
note 27, at 309. But see Geradin & Layne-Farrar, supra note 83, at 779–80 (critiquing this
methodology).
90. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [182].
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Another fundamental question regarding the determination of FRAND
royalties is whether the value of the patented technology should be
assessed prior to (ex ante) or after (ex post) the approval of the relevant
standard. Ex ante evaluation eliminates from consideration value that is
created simply by virtue of being included in a standard. U.S. courts, 91
enforcement agencies,92 and commentators93 have largely concluded that
a FRAND royalty should reflect the ex ante value of a patented technology
without considering the added value attributable to the inclusion of the
technology in a standard. In Unwired Planet, however, the U.K. court
expressly rejected the U.S. approach with little explanation, noting instead
that it was permissible to let a patentee appropriate some of the value
associated with the inclusion of its technology in a standard.94
Another point on which the U.K. court in Unwired Planet diverged
from decisions in the United States was whether the FRAND royalty rate
applicable to a particular patent is a single rate, or whether FRAND
represents a range of possible royalty rates. In Microsoft v. Motorola, the
U.S. district court determined a FRAND range for the SEPs covering each
standard at issue in order to assess whether the SEP holder complied with
its duty of good faith and fair dealing under applicable law; then, in setting
a final royalty, the court picked a specific rate within the allowable
range.95 In Unwired Planet, however, the U.K. court reasoned that it is

91. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d
903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60233, at *61 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
92. FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH
COMPETITION 22–23 (2011) (“A definition of RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented
technology at the time the standard is chosen is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition
among technologies to be incorporated into the standard.”).
93. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 610
(2007); Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 65, at 2036–39. Some commentators disagree.
See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 56, at 1867 (“[T]he apportionment requirement cannot logically prohibit
a SEP holder from receiving the value of the standard created by the technology in suit.”); Norman
V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (“[A]
FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of the standard
to the user.” (emphasis omitted)).
94. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [97]. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of
the Unwired Planet decision, see Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND
Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at
8 [hereinafter Contreras, Global Markets].
95. Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *203.
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better to maintain, as a matter of law, that there is but a single royalty rate
that qualifies as FRAND for any given set of SEPs and products.96
Finally, in addition to being “fair” and “reasonable,” FRAND royalty
rates must be “non-discriminatory” or, in the phrasing adopted by ANSI,
“demonstrably free of unfair discrimination.”97 That is, a SEP holder may
not discriminate in what it charges to different licensees. Today, most
courts and commentators agree that in order to comply with the nondiscrimination prong of a FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat
“similarly situated” licensees in a similar manner. Commentators have
understood this constraint to allow a SEP holder to charge differential
royalty rates to product manufacturers based on their size or market share,
even if they are otherwise similarly situated, on the basis that sellers of
more products will pay more in royalties.98 There is disagreement,
however, regarding the degree of similarity that must be evidenced by
potential licensees in order to benefit from the same royalty rate or rate
schedule. In TCL v. Ericsson, the court held that that similarly situated
firms include “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market”
for telecommunications products, thus entitling TCL, a producer of
relatively inexpensive smartphones, to the same favorable royalty rates
that the SEP holder had previously offered to producers of more expensive
smartphones such as Apple and Samsung.99 Needless to say, different
views regarding which firms are similarly situated can have a material
impact on the rates charged by SEP holders.100
C.

The Challenge of Global Rates

Courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates face a dilemma. On one
hand, patents are artifacts of national law and, by definition, have force
96. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [806(4)]. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect
of the Unwired Planet decision, see Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94, at 2–4 and J. Gregory
Sidak, Is a FRAND Royalty a Point or a Range?, 2 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 401, 401 (2017).
97. See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 12, § 3.1.1(b). For a detailed discussion of the
non-discrimination prong of FRAND commitments, see Jorge L. Contreras & Anne Layne-Farrar,
Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 12.
98. See Gilbert, supra note 14; Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic
Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 548 (2013).
99. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370
JVS(DFMX), 2018 WL 4488286, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018). This decision is currently under
appeal.
100. See, e.g., Peter Georg Picht, FRAND Determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired Planet
v. Huawei: Same Same but Different? (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research
Paper No. 18-07, 2018) (comparing how differently the courts in Unwired Planet and TCL v. Ericsson
interpret the nondiscrimination requirement of FRAND).
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only in the jurisdiction in which they are issued. On the other hand, the
parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with
operations (and patents) in dozens of jurisdictions across the globe.101 In
determining a FRAND royalty rate, should a court focus only on the
patents issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or should it consider
the global business relationship between the parties?
In the U.K. Unwired Planet case, Huawei, the potential licensee,
argued that the court should determine a FRAND royalty only for
Unwired Planet’s U.K. patents, as foreign patents could not be enforced
in the United Kingdom and were not the subject of the parties’
litigation.102 But the court disagreed. First, it observed that “the vast
majority” of SEP licenses in the industry, including all of the comparable
licenses introduced at trial, were granted on a worldwide basis, with only
occasional exclusions.103 It then noted that both Unwired Planet (which
held SEPs in forty-two countries) and Huawei (which operated in fiftyone countries) were global enterprises.104 Given these facts, the court
reasoned that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing
basis would agree on a worldwide licence.”105 In fact, the court considered
the prospect of two large multinational companies agreeing to countryby-country licensing “madness.”106 Accordingly, it held that, on these
facts, a FRAND license can only be a worldwide license, and it proceeded
to determine the FRAND royalty rates that Huawei should pay to Unwired
Planet on a global basis.107
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California reached a
similar conclusion in TCL v. Ericsson, also determining worldwide
FRAND royalty rates that TCL should pay to Ericsson.108 If courts in the
United Kingdom and the United States can set global royalty rates, then
why not courts in Germany, France, Canada, India, Korea, Japan, and
101. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, A Short History of Vringo’s Battle with ZTE, LINKEDIN (Oct. 11,
2017),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/short-history-vringos-battle-zte-david-l-cohen/
[https://perma.cc/Q9H4-AX8L] (describing the multijurisdictional litigation between Vringo and
ZTE); Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (May 3, 2014),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war
[https://perma.cc/278Z-JWBT] (describing litigation between Apple and Samsung across a dozen
jurisdictions).
102. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) [524].
103. Id. ¶ 534. Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China.
104. Id. ¶ 538.
105. Id. ¶ 543.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶¶ 583–89.
108. See TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV
14-341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15-2370 JVS(DFMx), 2018 WL 4488286, at *50–52 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14,
2018).
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China as well? In point of fact, a court in any jurisdiction that has the
parties before it can establish a global royalty rate for them. And if the
licensee refuses to agree to the global royalty rate determined by the court,
the licensee risks being enjoined from selling products in the issuing
jurisdiction. Thus, in Unwired Planet, Huawei could have refused to
accept the U.K. court’s global license, but if it did so, it would have had
to sacrifice its lucrative U.K. market, valued at approximately one billion
pounds per year. This is a Hobson’s choice for any sizable product
manufacturer: either accept a national court’s determination of global
FRAND royalty rates or lose access to that court’s national market.
In sum, a court in any country with a large enough internal market can
set worldwide FRAND rates for parties with international operations. And
once a worldwide license is granted, the licensee is authorized to
manufacture and sell licensed products around the globe, thereby mooting
proceedings in other jurisdictions, at least with respect to the issue of
FRAND royalties.109 As a result, the first court to set a FRAND royalty
rate will prevail over all other courts in the world.
As the author has discussed in other work, this situation sets the stage
for two unhealthy forms of litigation “race.”110 First is a “race to the
bottom” among jurisdictions—a well-known phenomenon that has been
observed in contexts ranging from corporate law111 to maritime vessel
registration.112 The willingness of judges in particular jurisdictions to set
high global FRAND rates could attract SEP holders to those jurisdictions,
much as U.S. patent holders were once attracted to the patent-friendly
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.113 By the same token,
109. In addition, a court that is in the midst of hearing a case may issue an anti-suit injunction
prohibiting the parties from prosecuting the case in other jurisdictions pending resolution by the first
court. See Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit Injunctions
and the Global Race to the Bottom in Disputes over Standards-Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. SCI.
TECH. L. (forthcoming 2019) (describing anti-suit injunctions in recent FRAND disputes).
110. See id. at §§ III.A, III.B; Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94.
111. Eisenberg & Miller, New York, supra note 25, at 1482–87 (describing New York’s sustained
efforts to attract commercial contract litigation through both procedural and substantive rules); Daniel
J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 381 (2005) (discussing the view that Delaware adjusted its corporate law to attract
business incorporations).
112. See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation, 79 J. AIR L. &
COMMERCE 151, 152–53 (2014) (“[I]t is fair to say that, as a direct consequence of what later became
the highly popular and deregulated ‘flag-out’ movement, the world, and especially our own country,
witnessed what can only be called a determined and successful race to the bottom.”).
113. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a ‘Renegade’ Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern
District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2018) (“For many years, the judges in the Eastern
District have encouraged patent plaintiffs to file their cases in the district.”); Brian J. Love & James
Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas,
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jurisdictions that establish reputations for setting low global FRAND rates
may attract standards implementers seeking to challenge the rates offered
by SEP holders. When jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules and
procedures, not to mention their substantive law, to attract litigants, legal
rules may progressively be diluted in an effort to respond to the wishes of
private parties.114
A second unhealthy form of litigation race occurs when a litigant rushes
to bring suit in a jurisdiction favorable to its position, often to foreclose
suit in a less favorable jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race
to the courthouse”115 and may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather
than negotiation or settlement. In 1981, Senator Bob Dole described a
similar patchwork of federal patent law as a “forum shopper’s delight and
an innovator’s nightmare” before the creation of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.116
Given the disparities in treatment of the same issues by courts around
the world, there is evidence that such forum shopping is already occurring
in the area of patent litigation, and this trend is only likely to continue.117
Huawei, in fact, raised the specter of such a race to the courthouse in its
appeal of the U.K. Unwired Planet decision, arguing that “if any court can
set a global rate then there will be a race between the SEP owner and the

20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017). The peculiar dominance of the Eastern District of Texas in U.S.
patent litigation may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC
Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). See Anderson,
supra, at 1571 (“The case struck a direct blow against what Justice Scalia famously referred to as the
‘renegade jurisdiction [of East Texas].’” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 846236, at *11)).
114. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold et al., Forum Selling Abroad, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (2019,
forthcoming) (observing phenomenon among German courts); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A
Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1135, 1163–64 (2013) (“competition between jurisdictions . . . creates comity concerns”
as well as other issues).
115. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The federal
declaratory judgment is not a prize to the winner of a race to the courthouses, but rather a declaration
of rights that obviates the need to risk a state criminal proceeding or a race to the courthouses.”).
116. 127 CONG. REC. S29,861 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Dole).
117. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or the
Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation?, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 701, 711
(2018) (“As the quality of administrative adjudication deteriorates at the ITC, patent holders engaged
in global disputes over licensing or infringement can choose to litigate their multijurisdictional
disputes before highly sophisticated tribunals in other countries.”); Matthew Bultman, Patent Owners
Taking Global View in Enforcement Efforts, LAW360 (July 18, 2018) (“The more the U.S. system is
out of harmony with international standards, the more your international corporations will prefer to
litigate elsewhere.” (quoting Randall Rader, a former chief judge of the Federal Circuit)).
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implementer to choose what each perceives to be the most favourable
jurisdiction.”118
II.

ANTECEDENTS AND BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A FRAND
RATE-SETTING TRIBUNAL

When a SEP holder and a product manufacturer disagree over the
royalty rates that the SEP holder may validly charge, some form of dispute
resolution is required. A typical form of dispute resolution is litigation.
However, as discussed above, there are numerous areas in which courts
disagree over the proper methodology for calculating FRAND royalties.
Likewise, there are increasing indications that national courts will seek to
make global FRAND rate determinations using their own favored
methodologies. This, coupled with the lack of transparency of existing
FRAND licenses and the failure of most FRAND calculations to address
adequately the totality of patents covering a particular standard, suggests
that any solution to the quandary of FRAND royalty rates must address
the three issues of transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness.119
This Article proposes that this tripartite goal may be achieved through a
global FRAND rate-setting tribunal rather than bilateral national
litigation. This Part discusses existing precedents for such a rate-setting
mechanism. These include existing alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
procedures for resolving FRAND disputes, mandatory arbitration
procedures in contexts such as Internet domain name disputes, and expert
rate-setting authorities in areas including copyright and public utilities.
A.

Arbitration of Patent and FRAND Disputes

Binding arbitration is a common and legally respected mechanism for
the resolution of commercial disputes.120 Like other commercial disputes,
many disputes regarding the terms of FRAND licensing commitments are
118. Unwired Planet [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 at ¶ 101. The Court of Appeals found this argument
unavailing, rejecting Huawei’s argument and reasoning: “It is true that a court in one country will
decide, as between the parties, whether a global or multi-territorial license is FRAND but that is
inevitable and we see nothing unfair about it . . . .” Id. ¶ 104. For a more detailed discussion of this
point, see Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94.
119. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Jacques de Werra, Global Policies for Arbitrating Intellectual Property
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, ch. 15 (Jacques de
Werra ed., 2013); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY &
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001); Cremades & Plehn, supra note 27, at 324–25 (noting that parties are free
to develop their own dispute resolution tribunals and procedures so long as they do not violate national
policy).
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already resolved through arbitration and other private ADR
mechanisms.121 The European Commission recognized the following
potential benefits of resolving FRAND disputes through ADR in 2014:
(i)
faster resolution of conflicts;
(ii)
lower costs [];
(iii) a lower threshold for parties to seek a solution when bilateral
negotiations fail;
(iv) more consistent outcomes, as parties can no longer do forum
shopping;
(v)
higher quality outcomes, as a result of applicable competences,
specialism and cumulative knowledge by the arbiters;
(vi) fairer outcomes, especially when licensing conditions are not
discussed under the threat of injunction;
(vii) more creative and more focused on problem solving than
litigation, which has always been based on an adversarial
model; and
(viii) once the dispute is over, the parties face no appeals, delays,
continuing expenses, or unknown risks.122
Another major benefit of arbitration over court adjudication is that,
unlike judicial awards, most arbitral awards rendered in accordance with
a customary set of due process procedures are recognized and enforceable
in all countries that are parties to the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.123
These benefits are widely recognized in different jurisdictions. The
U.S. Federal Trade Commission has acknowledged arbitration to be a
valid mechanism for resolving disputes over FRAND licensing.124 Most
121. Statistics on the number of FRAND disputes revolved through ADR are not available.
Anecdotally, the author has served as an arbitrator in a large international FRAND dispute. See also
Damien Geradin, FRAND Arbitration: The Determination of Fair, Reasonable and NonDiscriminatory Rates for SEPs by Arbitral Tribunals, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Sep. 2016) (providing
recommendations and observations based on experience as an arbitrator).
122. EUR. COMM’N, PATENTS AND STANDARDS: A MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR IPR-BASED
STANDARDIZATION 178 (2014); EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 11 (ADR “can offer swifter and
less costly dispute resolution” than litigation.); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of
Publicly-Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336–39 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller,
Arbitration] (listing perceived benefits of commercial arbitration over judicial dispute resolution);
Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation and
Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 748–49 (2000) (listing
twelve factors supporting arbitration of disputes).
123. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
124. See Motorola Mobility LLC, Case No. 1210120 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pdf
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recently, the Japan Patent Office, which has published a comprehensive
Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents,125
has actively promoted the use of ADR to resolve FRAND disputes.126
Adding to these governmental sources, numerous academic
commentators,127 government officials,128 and legal practitioners129 have
encouraged the use of ADR in resolving FRAND disputes. These
endorsements point to a growing recognition that ADR may offer
satisfactory global solutions to FRAND disputes in a manner that can be
more efficient than serial national-level litigation.
Numerous mechanisms exist that enable parties to resolve FRANDrelated disputes through binding arbitration, and several institutions
around the world have tailored rules and procedures for the adjudication
of patent disputes. For example, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), which operates the International Center for Dispute Resolution
(ICDR), has adopted Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent
Disputes.130 These rules address patent disputes within the framework of
AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.131 In
addition, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which
established the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center in 1994, has

[https://perma.cc/8K4A-NBES] [hereinafter Google Order] (decision and order) (binding arbitration
is an acceptable method for resolving disputes over FRAND terms.).
125. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD
ESSENTIAL PATENTS (2018), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2018/06/20180605003/201806050032.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNQ6-8MJL].
126. Press Release, Japan Patent Office, Mock International Arbitration - Toward Early Dispute
Resolution of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the 5G Era - Held in Tokyo (June 29, 2018),
https://www.jpo.go.jp/shoukai_e/soshiki_e/photo_gallery2018062991.html
[https://perma.cc/ME6R-QH59] (describing mock international arbitration involving renowned
international jurists).
127. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 22; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114; Lemley, supra
note 43, at 155.
128. See Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 4; Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice Antitrust Division, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9 (Oct. 10, 2012),
(transcript
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MS6-4GNS]).
129. See FOER & VAHEESAN, supra note 37, at 17; David A. Balto & Daniel I. Prywes, StandardSetting Disputes: The Need for FTC Guidelines, FTC WATCH (Mar. 25, 2002),
https://www.mlexwatch.com/ftcwatch/articles/177/ftc-watch-no-585 [http://perma.cc/JSB7-KD44].
130. RESOLUTION OF PATENT DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY RULES (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2006),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Resolution%20of%20Patent%20Disputes%20Supplementary%2
0Rules.pdf (last visited May 18, 2019).
131. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N
2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (last visited May 18, 2019).
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recently developed a set of model agreements for the submission of
FRAND disputes for WIPO mediation or arbitration.132
Despite these advances, bilateral arbitration is not a panacea for
multinational FRAND disputes. As a general rule, arbitration proceedings
are conducted privately. Thus all parties, including the arbitrators, are
obliged, either by law, ethical obligation, or contract, to maintain the
confidentiality of the evidence presented, the parties’ arguments, and the
arbitral award.133 Thus, the requirement of transparency is not met.
Moreover, arbitration proceedings are generally brought to resolve
disputes between two parties only and have little to no bearing on disputes
with other parties. They thus lack the element of comprehensiveness.
Finally, there is no mechanism within the international arbitration
framework for precedential or res judicata effect of one decision on
another, thus eliminating any requirement of consistency from one
decision to the next. Thus, while arbitration of FRAND disputes may have
some advantages over litigation, arbitration does not satisfactorily address
the most significant problems inherent in FRAND disputes today.
B.

Mandatory Arbitration

Arbitration generally takes place when parties mutually agree to forego
judicial resolution of a dispute in favor of private resolution of their
differences.134 Non-judicial resolution of disputes cannot be compelled;
the parties must, at some point, agree to it. Of course, not all arbitration
agreements are negotiated between sophisticated parties. Standardized
consumer contracts for telephone service, credit cards, and computer
software, as well as employment agreements, often contain arbitration
clauses that are routinely enforced by the courts even if poorly understood
by consumers.135 Similarly, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute

132. See WIPO ADR for FRAND Disputes, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/ict/frand/ [https://perma.cc/MR8G-DRME].
133. See generally TREVOR COOK & ALEJANDRO I. GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ARBITRATION, ch. 9 (2010); de Werra, supra note 120, at 361–63 (“Confidentiality is
generally viewed as one of the classic reasons why parties choose arbitration.”).
134. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 120, at 53 (“The foundation for almost every international
arbitration is an international arbitration agreement. Absent a valid agreement to arbitrate, there is
generally no basis for requiring arbitration or for enforcing an arbitral award against a party.”).
135. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (upholding employment
arbitration clauses prohibiting class action claims); Paul Bennett Marrow & Craig E. Penn, The
‘Circle of Assent’ Doctrine and the Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clause: When the
Unconscionable Contract Analysis Just Won’t Do, 68 DISPUTE RESOL. J., No. 3, 2013 (discussing
enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion); Katherine V.W. Stone,
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Resolution Policy (UDRP) for resolving Internet domain name disputes is
mandated by agreements between the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) and Internet domain name registrars,
which, in turn, pass this requirement down to individual domain name
registrants.136 Thus, the term “mandatory” arbitration is something of a
misnomer, as an agreement technically underlies all such arbitration
proceedings.
Likewise, parties that participate in an SDO, either through formal
membership or involvement in its standards-development activities, are
generally deemed to have agreed to abide by the SDO’s rules and
policies.137 Thus, if an SDO, as part of its formal rules, requires that its
participants submit disputes regarding FRAND royalties to binding
arbitration in lieu of court adjudication, then the participants in that SDO
who are bound by those rules must do so.
This “mandatory” arbitration approach is not uncommon in patent
pools, several of which require their members to submit disputes to
arbitration.138 Likewise, a handful of SDOs require that certain disputes
among their members be resolved through binding arbitration. These
include the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Project, which requires its
members to resolve disputes regarding licenses of DVB standards under
the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);139
the VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA), which requires
patent-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration administered by
VITA itself;140 and the Blu-Ray Disc Association, which requires that
Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law,
61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164 (2013) (discussing employment agreement arbitration clauses).
136. See WIPO Guide to Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); LAURA
DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 192–94 (2014). There are four
authorized providers of UDRP arbitration services: WIPO itself, the Forum (formerly the National
Arbitration Forum), the Czech Arbitration Court (CAC), and the Asian Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). See Doug Isenberg, What It Costs to File a UDRP Complaint,
GIGALAW BLOG (Feb. 13, 2019), https://giga.law/blog/2019/2/27/what-it-costs-to-file-a-udrpcomplaint (last visited May 18, 2019); DENARDIS, supra, at 193.
137. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent
Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV 479, 503–04 (2015) (describing the means by which SDO policies are
made binding on participants, either through contract or corporate policy).
138. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1344–46 (describing arbitration requirements for aviation and
automobile patent pools).
139. Memorandum of Understanding from the Digital Video Broadcasting Project, § 14.7 (Jan. 3,
2014), http://www.dvb.org/resources/public/documents_site/dvb_mou.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9QJEK6Z].
140. VITA, VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.5 (revision 2.8 Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.vita.com/resources/Documents/Policies/vso-pp-r2d8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6NN-
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patent licensing disputes be resolved through arbitration by the AAA.141
In contrast, other SDO policies merely state that members “may” arbitrate
SEP-related disputes, in which case arbitration is voluntary.142 In practice,
it appears that neither the DVB nor the VITA arbitration policies have
formally been invoked. Thus, the only documented invocation of a
mandatory SDO arbitration policy has been at the Blu-Ray Disc
Association.143
In 2013, Professors Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro recommended that
SDOs mandate that portfolio royalty rates for SEPs subject to FRAND
licensing be determined through binding arbitration.144 The form of
arbitration they proposed for this purpose was so-called “baseball” or
“final offer” arbitration.145 Under this procedure, each party submits a
sealed bid to an arbitrator, and the arbitrator is limited to choosing one of
the competing bids without modification.146 Lemley and Shapiro also
ZM9E] (“Any VSO member who believes a WG Member or the VITA Member Company that the
WG Member represents has not complied with his/her or its obligations under this Patent Policy,
including but not limited to obligations under Section 10.3 to grant licenses on terms that are fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory, may submit his/her claim in this respect to the applicable WG
Chairperson. If the claim is not thereupon resolved on an informal basis within fifteen (15) days of its
submission, the WG Chairperson will commence an Arbitration Procedure in accordance with the
provisions set forth below.”). The VITA patent policy is best known for its requirement that patent
holders disclose the maximum royalty rates they will charge for patents essential to VITA standards
on an ex ante basis, a provision that was the subject of considerable controversy. See Contreras, Ex
Ante, supra note 36, at 173–74.
141. BLU-RAY DISC ASS’N, AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS OF BLU-RAY DISC ASSOCIATION
cl. 16(5),
(Oct.
1,
2010),
http://www.blu-raydisc.com/Assets/Downloadablefile/BDA_
Bylaws_%28v2.0%29-18618.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZHP-SUFW].
142. An interesting hybrid “balanced safe harbour” approach was proposed at ETSI around 2014,
in which SEP holders would have been prohibited from seeking an injunction to prevent an infringer
from operating under a SEP until the SEP holder had submitted to binding arbitration or judicial
determination of the appropriate FRAND rate. The proposal, which was backed by several major SEP
holders, was not adopted. See Harri Kalimo et al., EU Intellectual Property Rights Law – Driving
Innovation or Stifling the Digital Single Market?, in EU ECONOMIC LAW IN A TIME OF CRISIS 151,
155 (Harri Kalimo & Max S. Jansson eds., 2016).
143. The Blu-Ray arbitration policy became the subject of litigation in Zoran Corp. v. DTS, Inc.,
No. C 08-4655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), a dispute concerning
the SEP licensing terms offered by DTS to its fellow SDO member Zoran. Zoran brought an
arbitration claim against DTS, claiming that DTS violated its FRAND commitment and
simultaneously filed an antitrust and patent misuse suit against DTS in federal district court. Id. at
*2–3. Among other things, the court validated the Blu-Ray arbitration policy and stayed Zoran’s
antitrust and misuse claims pending resolution of the arbitration. Id. at *19–20.
144. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1138.
145. See id. at 1141, 1144–46.
146. There are several variants of baseball arbitration, including forms in which issues are decided
serially, offers are revealed to or concealed from the counterparty, parties are permitted to submit two
final offers, and more. See Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution
in Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 393–98 (1999).
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proposed that the decision of the arbitrator be disclosed to other willing
licensees of the relevant SEPs,147 at least partially addressing the concerns
over transparency raised above.
While some commentators supported the prospect of SDO-mandated
arbitration of FRAND disputes,148 the Lemley-Shapiro proposal
precipitated a cascade of opposition from others on grounds ranging from
due process concerns about requiring parties to waive their right to seek
redress from the courts, concerns that the binary nature of baseball
arbitration could not guaranty that a FRAND royalty would actually be
chosen, concerns regarding bias and accuracy of the decision, and
potential gamesmanship with respect to the parties’ selected rates.149
Despite some similarities in the FRAND rate-setting tribunal proposed in
this Article and the Lemley-Shapiro proposal, the use of baseball
arbitration is not suggested. While baseball arbitration may provide an
expedient mechanism for disposing of disputes between two parties, it is
not a suitable mechanism for determining an aggregate FRAND rate
across multiple parties and patents (the need for comprehensiveness), nor
does it satisfy the need for a solution that is transparent (given that the
baseball-style arbitrator is not required to reveal his or her reasoning in
reaching a decision) or consistent (given that baseball-style arbitrators
cannot apply consistent methodologies when reaching decisions if they
are bound only to select one of the two options presented to them by the
parties).

147. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145.
148. See, e.g., FOER & VAHEESAN, supra note 37, at 17 (“SSOs should establish and require
participation in dispute resolution processes that offer a quicker, more cost-effective alternative to
litigation.”); Balto & Prywes, supra note 129 (“Standard-setting groups should be encouraged to
require alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes about licensing terms.”).
149. See RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 79 (“While the majority of respondents seem to be
favourable to the introduction of arbitration mechanisms, few appear ready to support making them
mandatory.”); Geradin, supra note 121, at 5 (objecting to loss of party freedom to self-determine
arbitral rules and tribunal, as well as unsuitability of baseball arbitration to determining FRAND
royalty rates); Pierre Larouche et al., Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a
Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 584 (2014)
(“[T]he mandatory-arbitration proposal is . . . an unnecessary intervention given the absence of
market failure and, more importantly, given that it poses a signiﬁcant risk of negatively impacting
the successful adoption of technical, consensus-based industry standards.”); J. Gregory Sidak,
Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 38 (2014) (“The package that Lemley and Shapiro call ‘best practices’ is in fact
not a narrow proposal for binding baseball arbitration but rather a roadmap to redefine patent
rights in a manner that would transfer wealth from inventors to infringers.”); Contreras &
Newman, supra note 22, at 43–44 (arguing arbitrators’ lack of enunciated reasoning in a baseball
arbitration decision does little to guide future behavior, nor can the result be assumed to be FRAND).
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Rate-Setting

As discussed above, if parties cannot mutually agree on FRAND
royalty rates, they currently have recourse to the courts as well as private
arbitration. In either case, the parties are bound by the rate determination
made by an independent adjudicatory authority (subject to permitted
appeals) after applicable evidence is presented and arguments are made.
Thus, the notion that FRAND royalties can be established by an external
(non-party, non-SDO) body is not a new one. However, as discussed in
the Introduction, courts around the world, and even within the same
jurisdiction, may differ with regard to both the methodologies they use
and the evidence that they consider in determining FRAND rates.150 This
inconsistency, which appears to be increasing, is one of the principal
pitfalls of the current FRAND system. Thus, any effective solution should
offer a consistent methodology for making FRAND rate determinations.
One well-known method for establishing rates in a consistent manner
is allocating rate-setting authority to an expert body. Rate-setting bodies
have been established in a multitude of contexts throughout history.
Richard Epstein traces the origin of rate-setting authority to Sir Thomas
Hale’s influential 1670 treatise De Portibus Maris, which discusses the
need to regulate the prices charged by owners of wharves and other public
accommodations “affected with a publick interest.”151 Epstein goes on to
recount the history of rate setting in England and the United States in
industries including grain elevators, railroads, and public utilities.152
Interestingly, many of the rate-setting tribunals established in these early
proceedings sought to ensure that rates charged by regulated providers
would be “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND),153 echoing and
foreshadowing the FRAND commitments of today.154
One of the touchstones of a rate-setting tribunal is that it should operate
under a consistent set of principles and procedures, taking into account all

150. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying discussion.
151. Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Rate Regulation in the United States
Supreme Court: Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 345, 346 (2013)
(quoting Matthew Hale, “De Portibus Maris”, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW
OF ENGLAND 77–78 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)).
152. Id. at 350–65.
153. Id. at 348–50, 352–57 (discussing, inter alia, the Minnesota Rate Cases, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)
(“equal and reasonable” rates), and Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527 (1898) (“reasonable” rates)).
154. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 47–48 (2015) (tracing origin
of SDO FRAND commitments to 1912 Terminal Railroad case that required access to St. Louis
railroad terminal on “just and reasonable” terms).
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relevant evidence pertinent to the case at hand.155 Its decisions should also
be written and made public so as to offer as much guidance as possible to
the industry in shaping future conduct. The rate-setting body should also
continue in existence beyond the resolution of particular disputes, thus
enabling its members to develop relevant expertise and custom that can
be applied consistently from case to case.156 The expertise and industry
knowledge resident within such a body can reduce the cost of each case
decided, as the parties need not educate novice judges or juries regarding
the practices and norms of the industry with each new case.157 Moreover,
a rate setting tribunal can apply independent judgment and discretion
when determining rates that must meet a loosely-defined standard, such
as the “just and reasonable” rates that are established by public utility
tribunals.158
The benefits of consistency and continuity in a rate-setting body were
acknowledged by Congress in connection with royalties under the
compulsory license provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act.159 In 1993,
Congress enacted the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act, which
provided that such royalty determinations would be made by a series of
ad hoc three-member Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels (CARPs)
appointed by the Librarian of Congress.160 The CARPs and their rotating
group of ad hoc arbitrators were heavily criticized, among other things,
for unpredictability, inconsistency, lack of expertise, and potential bias.161
As a result, in 2004 Congress replaced the ad hoc CARPs with a
permanent Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) consisting of three full-time
Copyright Royalty Judges.162
155. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 366.
156. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.27[C] (2018) (discussing criticism of former ad hoc
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels).
157. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1317 (noting inefficiencies of serial court litigation over
copyright license rates and suggesting a “rate court” as a means for avoiding excessive transaction
costs).
158
See William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in
America, 35 YALE J. REG. 721 (2018) (tracing history of “just price” determinations from Aristotle
through modern public utility regulation).
159. The Copyright Act of 1976 established four categories of compulsory copyright license:
musical mechanical, noncommercial broadcasting, jukebox, and cable television. See 2 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[A].
160. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 8 U.S.C. § 1288 (2018)). The 1993 Act replaced
a prior rate-setting authority established under the 1976 Copyright Act. See 2 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[C].
161. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[C].
162. H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 20 (2004).
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While there are clearly distinctions between the compulsory licensing
of copyrights and the FRAND licensing of SEPs, many aspects of the
CRB could be adopted in a new FRAND rate-setting tribunal. These
similarities begin with the fundamental purpose of each body: to establish
rates for IP licensing when private parties are committed to grant all users
of the relevant IP a license at rates that are initially unspecified and when
the parties are unable to reach agreement amongst themselves.163 As such,
several attributes of the CRB can usefully inform the design of a FRAND
rate-setting tribunal. For instance, Copyright Royalty Judges are required
by statute to possess certain expertise: one (the Chief Judge) must have
experience in adjudications, arbitrations, or trials, and the other two
Judges must have significant knowledge in the field of copyright law and
economics, respectively.164 Likewise, in making their determinations, the
CRB evaluates substantial evidence and testimony from a range of fact
and expert witnesses.165 Illustrating the scale and scope of these hearings,
the Board’s 2015 proceedings regarding rates for noninteractive
webcasting lasted four months and generated more than 12,000 pages of
exhibits, with oral testimony from forty-seven witnesses (including
fourteen economists).166 These observations suggest that it is possible to
establish an expert rate-setting board with the capability, capacity, and
expertise to establish royalty levels with respect to complex intellectual
property matters.
Likewise, the CRB is charged with allocating a large royalty pool to
the owners of copyrights in television broadcasts after they have been
retransmitted by cable providers.167 In some cases, hundreds or thousands
163. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Assn. of Am. v. Librarian of Congress, 608 F.3d 861, 863 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (“By law, the Copyright Royalty Board sets the terms and rates for copyright royalties
when copyright owners and licensees fail to negotiate terms and rates themselves.”).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1).
165. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., 608 F.3d at 864 (describing CRB proceedings
“involving 28 days of live testimony, more than 140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions,
and orders”).
166. David R. Strickler, Royalty Rate Setting for Sound Recordings by the United States Copyright
Royalty Board: The Judicial Need for Independent Scholarly Economic Analysis, 12 REV. ECON. RES.
ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 2 (2015); see also Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., 608 F.3d at 864 (CRB
hearings regarding compulsory license rates in 2006 involved “28 days of live testimony, more than
140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions, and orders”).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1); see also Indep. Producers Grp. v. Librarian of Cong., 792 F.3d 132,
135 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Under 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), after a broadcast television station transmits
copyrighted material to its viewers, cable systems may retransmit that material without first obtaining
the copyright owner’s permission. In exchange for that privilege, cable systems must deposit
statutorily prescribed royalty fees with the Register of Copyrights. The Copyright Royalty Board is
responsible for determining how to distribute those fees to the appropriate copyright owners.”
(citations omitted)).
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of copyright holders can be implicated in these proceedings. The
procedure by which the CRB determines this allocation is informative.
First, all copyright holders who wish to claim a share of the previous
year’s aggregate pool of cable retransmission royalties must file a claim
with the CRB.168 If all claimants agree how the pool should be allocated,
then the CRB simply authorizes the distribution of funds to the claimants
in the amounts agreed.169 However, if the claimants cannot agree, then the
CRB conducts a two-phase proceeding to determine the allocation of
royalties.170 These proceedings are explained by the D.C. Circuit as
follows:
During Phase I, claimants may group themselves into categories
based on the kind of programming that they own. Using evidence
supplied by the claimants, the Board calculates the marketplace
value of each category. It then assigns a percentage of the total
royalty fee fund to each category based on its value relative to
other categories. During Phase II, the Board subdivides the fees
allotted to each category among the individual claimants within
that category.
Phase I and Phase II proceedings follow the same set of
procedures. First, the Board publishes a notice of the proceeding
in the Federal Register. Claimants then petition to participate in
the proceeding. A three-month voluntary negotiation period
ensues, during which the participating claimants attempt to reach
an agreement without assistance from the Board.
At the end of the voluntary negotiation period, if any disputes
remain, the Board plays a more active role in the process. The
Board accepts written statements from the participating
claimants, allows the participating claimants to conduct
discovery, and orders a post-discovery settlement conference. If
the participating claimants are still unable to resolve their
differences, the Board then conducts a hearing and issues a final
determination. Finally, the Librarian of Congress publishes the
Board’s determination in the Federal Register and distributes the
royalty fees.171
As the above description demonstrates, royalty determination and
distribution proceedings conducted by the CRB are not dissimilar to the
types of determinations that would be required of a FRAND rate-setting
168.
169.
170.
171.

17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(A).
Id. § 111(d)(4)(B)–(d)(4)(C), 801(b)(7).
Id. § 111(d)(4)(B).
Indep. Producers Grp., 792 F.3d at 135–36 (citations omitted).
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tribunal: multiple parties with divergent interests are involved; the parties
are initially permitted to work out an arrangement amongst themselves,
but if they cannot, the tribunal’s procedures are activated; and the tribunal
is empowered to compel discovery, conduct hearings, and otherwise
adduce all relevant evidence.172
The similarity between FRAND rate determinations and copyright
royalty tribunal determinations has also been observed in the U.K. Sir
Justice Colin Birss of the U.K. High Court (Patents) made a such an
observation about the rate-setting capability of the U.K. Copyright
Tribunal, of which he was once a member,173 and its similarity to FRAND
rate determinations: “Similar kinds of analysis are done in the United
Kingdom Copyright Tribunal setting an appropriate royalty rate in a
licensing scheme. The parties there are not challenging the underlying
rights. The only issue is the tariff terms. There is nothing intrinsically
unjusticiable about the issue to be resolved.”174 A similar observation was
made by Sir Justice Henry Carr in a recent case management decision, in
which he noted that the mechanics of FRAND rate determinations “are
entirely familiar” to “those familiar with . . . the Copyright Tribunal” and
“are not that complicated, and the courts are used to dealing with them.”175
It is important to note that the copyright rate-setting bodies discussed
above are governmentally-chartered entities whose determinations are
subject to review by the courts under both the tribunal’s authorizing
legislation and the Administrative Procedure Act.176 This Article does not
propose the creation of a new governmental rate-setting body. In fact, it
is precisely the potential for national governmental bodies (e.g., courts,
agencies) to diverge and compete in their rate-setting methodologies (i.e.,
the race to the bottom) that calls for the establishment of a single,
international, non-governmental rate-setting tribunal for FRAND
royalties, as discussed in greater detail in the next Part.

172. This being said, not all observers are satisfied with the CRB’s copyright royalty
determinations. For example, Professor Mark Schultz has criticized the CRB for consistently favoring
licensees in its sound recording royalty determinations, a bias that he also finds in the determination
of SEP royalties. Mark Schultz, The Market for Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Bargaining
in the Shadow of Compulsory Licensing (Nov. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3292512 (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).
173. Beverly Barton, An Interview with Mr Justice Birss: Part 1/3: Getting Personal, THOMPSON
REUTERS: DISPUTE RESOL. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://disputeresolutionblog.practicallaw.com/aninterview-with-mr-justice-birss-part-13-getting-personal/ [https://perma.cc/9BCY-5BQW].
174. Vringo Infrastructure, Inc. v. ZTE (UK) Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Pat) 1591 [35] (Birss J).
175. TQ Delta, LLC v. Zyxel Commc’ns UK Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 353 [22] (Carr J). Mr. Justice
Carr goes on to discuss several similarities between FRAND rate determinations and the
determinations of the U.K. Copyright Tribunal. Id. at [24]–[25].
176. See Indep. Producers Grp., 792 F.3d at 136.
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR A GLOBAL FRAND RATE-SETTING
TRIBUNAL
As discussed in the preceding Parts, a mechanism is needed for the
resolution of disputes concerning FRAND royalty rates that addresses the
tripartite issues of transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness.
This Part outlines a proposal for global, non-governmental FRAND ratesetting tribunal that takes into account each of these issues.
The major features of the proposed FRAND Tribunal are the following:
SDOs can require (mandatory version) or offer (optional version) that
their participants resolve all disputes regarding the level of FRAND
royalties to be charged for SEPs covering the SDO’s standards through an
international, non-governmental rate-setting tribunal. Once the tribunal is
engaged, it will collect all available evidence regarding the patented and
unpatented technology included in a particular standard, determine an
aggregate royalty rate for the standard, and apportion royalties among all
SEP holders. Other than these rate-setting matters, the tribunal would
adjudicate no other issues, and related breach of contract, antitrust, and
competition law claims would continue to be subject to adjudication by
any court(s) having jurisdiction. SDO participants would be required to
refrain from seeking injunctive relief against potential licensees during the
pendency of rate-setting proceedings, but once FRAND royalty rates are
determined for a specific standard, a SEP holder will be permitted to
pursue injunctions against product manufacturers that refuse to accept a
license at the designated rate within a reasonable time. The remainder of
this Part discusses details of this proposal, including alternative structures
that could be created.
A.

Mandatory and Optional Versions

There are two versions of the FRAND Tribunal proposed by this
Article: a mandatory version and an optional version.177 The difference
between these two versions relates solely to whether use of the FRAND
Tribunal is mandatory or optional for participants in an SDO. In the
mandatory version, use of the FRAND Tribunal would be required to
177. An even stronger variant exists (“pre-emptive”), in which the SDO refers all standards covered
by FRAND-encumbered SEPs to the rate tribunal, even before a dispute arises. A pre-emptive
mechanism would result in rate-setting for all of the SDO’s FRAND-encumbered standards. While
there are benefits to such a pre-emptive approach (e.g., rates would be set early, before disputes arise
in the market), it could also be more burdensome on SDO participants and could increase transactional
costs in settings in which no dispute over FRAND rates may ever have arisen. As such, this Article
does not recommend the pre-emptive approach.
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determine FRAND royalty rates when the parties cannot mutually agree
on them. Though such a requirement could be imposed through various
mechanisms, including statutory, regulatory, and treaty obligations, the
most effective mechanism for imposing such a requirement is through
binding provisions of SDO policies.178 In the optional version, the
FRAND Tribunal is available for parties to use if they so wish, much as
arbitration and other ADR mechanisms are currently available for the
voluntary adjudication of FRAND disputes.179
The choice of private over governmental adjudication has longstanding
precedent in the area of intellectual property pooling, where private
mechanisms have historically been substituted for legal structures.180 This
Article likewise favors the use of a FRAND Tribunal under SDO policy
requirements rather than governmental mandates (legislative or
administrative rules) for several reasons. First, one of the problems
affecting FRAND rate determinations today is that of inconsistency across
jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, at least a dozen jurisdictions are
involved in contemporary disputes over standardized products.181 The
prospect of a dozen jurisdictions enacting identical mandates ceding the
power of local courts to an international non-governmental body appears
slim and would most likely result in a patchwork of divergent and
contradictory rules that would do little to alleviate the issues caused by
inconsistency across jurisdictions. Of course, such consistency could be
achieved, at least to some degree, if the commitment to utilize the tribunal
were the subject of a treaty obligation. However, the difficulty of
multilateral treaty negotiation is significant, particularly in the current
geopolitical environment, and it is extremely unlikely that such a treaty
could be negotiated and ratified within a reasonable period of time, if ever.
An SDO-based requirement, while not universal in scope (i.e., it
pertains only to participants in SDOs that impose the requirement), at least
offers consistency across licenses pertaining to the imposing SDO’s
standards, irrespective of the jurisdictions in which its participants
operate. That is, if a particular SDO mandates—through its bylaws,
corporate policies, membership agreements, or other documentation—
that its participants utilize the proposed FRAND Tribunal to resolve
FRAND rate disputes, then an SDO participant will be obliged to utilize
178. See supra Section II.B and accompanying text (discussing imposition of binding requirements
on SDO participants).
179. See supra Section II.A (discussing voluntary arbitration of FRAND disputes).
180. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1347 (quoting Recording of Patent Pooling Agreements and
Contracts with the Commissioner of Patents: Hearing on H.R. 4523 Before the H. Comm. on Patents,
74th Cong. 501, 529–30 (1935) (statement of Sidney R. Kent, President, Fox Film Corp.)).
181. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

07 - Contreras (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:58 PM

740

[Vol. 94:701

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

the tribunal whether it is based in the United States, Europe, or Japan and
whether an unlicensed manufacturer of standardized products is based in
China, Korea, or Brazil.
The mandatory version of this proposal, though in some respects novel,
is by no means unprecedented. As discussed in Section II.A above, a few
SDOs already require arbitration of disputes by their participants, and in
the one case in which this arbitration requirement was challenged, it was
upheld.182 Likewise, arbitration of disputes is mandated in a variety of
other contexts, including WIPO’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure
for Internet domain name controversies.183
One important question relating to mandatory use of the proposed
FRAND Tribunal is the degree to which an SDO may require nonparticipants (i.e., manufacturers of standardized products that were not
involved in developing the standard) to participate in such proceedings.
As discussed above, an SDO may impose binding requirements upon its
participants through a variety of contractual and corporate means, but it
has less authority to bind organizations that have not voluntarily acceded
to its rules and policies.184 Yet in order for the proposed FRAND Tribunal
to achieve the goal of comprehensiveness, it should take into account
patents held by SDO non-participants. There are several ways that this
issue could be addressed. First, the SDO could affirmatively require, as a
condition to the use of its standards (through a clickwrap or similar
agreement), that such user agree to resolve any disputes regarding
FRAND royalties through the FRAND Tribunal. Second, if an SDO did
not wish to impose such a condition on the use of its standards, it could
simply impose the requirement on its participants and hope, not
unreasonably, that non-participants would view this dispute resolution
mechanism as superior to litigation and thus participate. In many cases,
however, major product manufacturers participate in SDOs and even hold
SEPs themselves.185 Thus, the number of firms that would not be formally
bound by the proposed adjudication requirements is likely to be small.
It is important to note that while the mandatory version of this proposal
is recommended, the optional version could also have a significant
positive impact on the FRAND royalty landscape. Under both versions of

182. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing Zoran Corp. v. DTS, Inc., No. C 084655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009)).
183. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered
Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507 (2016) (discussing the implications of SDO “outsiders”
holding SEPs); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1153 (discussing issues relating to arbitration
with unwilling implementers).
185. See Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7, at 534, fig.A1.
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this proposal, a rate-setting proceeding is triggered by the emergence of a
dispute between a SEP holder and a product manufacturer over the
appropriate level of FRAND royalties. Once the tribunal proceeding is
triggered, whether by operation of the SDO’s policy (mandatory) or by
mutual agreement of the parties (optional), the tribunal will proceed to
gather all relevant evidence concerning the value of patented and
unpatented technology contributing to the standard. The tribunal will then
develop both an aggregate royalty rate applicable to all SEPs covering the
standard as well as an individual allocation of that aggregate royalty to
each SEP holder (i.e., an allocation schedule listing each SEP holder and
the portion of the aggregate FRAND royalty to which it is entitled). Thus,
the FRAND Tribunal’s findings will not be limited to the parties that
initiated the proceeding—they will be comprehensive.
In the mandatory version of the proposal, every other SEP holder with
patents covering the relevant standard is bound to offer FRAND royalty
rates consistent with the allocation schedule developed by the tribunal.
Additional proceedings are not required, thus reducing the overall
transactional burden on the market.
In the optional version of the proposal, other SEP holders are not
strictly bound by the findings of the FRAND Tribunal in the initial
proceeding. However, the FRAND Tribunal’s proceedings, and the
resulting schedule of FRAND allocations to each SEP holder, will be
made public186 and will thus be available to any court or arbitral tribunal
that later parties choose to adjudicate their dispute. As such, it is likely
that the FRAND Tribunal’s findings will serve, at a minimum, as
informative to a subsequent court or arbitrator and, preferably, as a
presumptive finding regarding the appropriate FRAND rate for the
standard in dispute. Thus, even under the optional version of this proposal,
litigation time and cost may be reduced on an industry-wide basis.
It is anticipated that some SDOs may be reluctant, at first, to adopt the
mandatory version of this proposal and may, instead, choose the optional
version.187 Use of the optional version could serve as a “trial run” of the
FRAND Tribunal for early-adopter SDOs, allowing them to observe the
effectiveness of the FRAND Tribunal and its decision-making processes.
If an SDO is satisfied with the FRAND Tribunal during such a trial period,
it may later choose to adopt the mandatory version of this proposal.

186. See infra Section III.G.
187. A similar pattern of adoption was observed in 2006–2007, when several SDOs considered the
adoption of ex ante licensing disclosure policies. Of three SDOs that explicitly considered such
policies, only one (VITA) adopted a mandatory version of the policy. The other two (IEEE and ETSI)
adopted optional versions. See Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36 (discussing this episode).
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Establishment, Composition, and Compensation of Tribunal

In terms of the institutional “home” of the FRAND Tribunal, it is likely
that a governmental agency such as a national competition regulator or
patent office, whether in the United States, Europe, Japan, or elsewhere,
would raise issues of inherent bias and favoritism and thus attract less
multilateral support than an international or non-governmental
organization. Thus, a recognized non-governmental international body
would likely be a better host for the FRAND Tribunal. Such bodies
include institutions established specifically for the resolution of
international disputes, such as the ICC, AAA, London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA), or an international non-governmental
organization with a broader focus on technology and economic issues
such as WIPO188 or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).189 Though, as noted above, SDOs have
traditionally been loath to become involved in royalty negotiations among
their members,190 an international SDO with a broad base of support and
international recognition such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) might serve as a suitable host for the FRAND
Tribunal. Finally, smaller and more specialized ADR bodies have arisen
around the world, some of which advertise expertise in patent disputes.191
The initial expenses of forming the FRAND Tribunal and selecting its
members will be borne by the FRAND Tribunal’s host institution, though
it is not inconceivable that government agencies supporting the improved
determination of FRAND royalties may also extend funding to this effort.
Contributions from corporate donors could also be solicited, but it is
important that the impartiality of the FRAND Tribunal be maintained.
Thus, corporate interests should have no role, formal or informal, in the
governance or oversight of the tribunal.
It is anticipated that the FRAND Tribunal will have ongoing existence
and will thus have a pool of arbitrators available to hear cases as they
arise. Individual matters will be heard by panels of three arbitrators
188. WIPO is one of four authorized arbitral bodies for UDRP domain name disputes, the other
three being the Forum (formerly the National Arbitration Forum), the Czech Arbitration Court (CAC),
and the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). See supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
189. Care should be taken, however, to avoid linking the tribunal to an industry association with a
clear bias either toward patent holders or product manufacturers.
190. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying discussion.
191. See, e.g., FEDARB, SPECIALIZED PANELS, https://www.fedarb.com/specialized-panels/
[https://perma.cc/C6VA-6NKJ] (offering more than thirty retired judges and other experienced
neutrals with expertise in patent law).
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selected at random from the pool, with a chair selected from among the
three panel members.192 Individual compensation of the three panel
members will be equal, with no additional compensation to the chair.193
All members of the FRAND Tribunal will be selected by consensus of
the SDOs that have mandated the tribunal’s use in resolving FRAND
disputes. Each arbitrator must have substantial expertise in technical
standardization processes and not be employed by, or serve as a consultant
to, any private company having a direct interest in the outcome of such
disputes (i.e., a SEP holder or product manufacturer).194 The tribunal
should not include individuals who serve primarily as government
officials. It is anticipated that tribunal members will generally consist of
retired judges, private legal practitioners, academics, and consultants.195
Unlike conventional arbitration, the fees of the tribunal will not be paid
by the parties initiating the proceeding.196 Rather, it is proposed that a
small surcharge be imposed on each royalty payment concerning a SEP
covering the relevant standard. These surcharges would be collected by
the tribunal and used to cover the tribunal’s costs and expenses, including
payment to the individual arbitrators. This approach would fairly spread
the cost of the tribunal among all users of the standard and holders of
patents essential to the standard, rather than burdening the initial parties
to a proceeding with the cost of a proceeding that is likely to benefit a
much larger segment of the market.197
192. See BORN, supra note 120, at 453–54 (describing current practices for arbitration panel
selection).
193. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 1189, 1210 (2003) (describing methods for
compensating arbitrators).
194. This proposed requirement finds support in the expertise requirements of the CRB. See supra
note 164 and accompanying text.
195. With regard to the selection of a committee of impartial experts on FRAND-related issues, it
may be informative to review the selection process and criteria used by the U.S. National Academies
of Science when forming its Committee on Intellectual Property Management in Standard-Setting
Processes. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 39, at v (listing committee members, including the
author of this comment); Call for Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents,
EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/call-experts-licensing-andvaluation-standard-essential-patents_en [https://perma.cc/FN4V-LJG7] (the European Commission’s
recent call for experts’ applications).
196. These fees, which include both charges for the arbitrators’ time and expenses, the facility, and
the arbitral tribunal, can be sizable. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do
Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 447–49 (2010)
(discussing arbitral fees).
197. This approach bears similarities to the manner in which ICANN funds its operations through
a surcharge on the fees paid by every domain name registrant. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE
ROOT 188–90 (2002).
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This being said, the compensation of individual members of the
tribunal should be based on a fixed or hourly rate and should not be tied
to royalty revenue. Creating any dependency between arbitrator
compensation and patent royalty revenue would have the clear potential
to bias tribunal rulings in favor of higher royalty determinations.
Individual tribunal member compensation should thus be wholly
independent of the outcome of any given rate determination.
C.

Tribunal’s Limited Authority

The tribunal’s authority will be limited to the determination of
worldwide FRAND royalty rates for all SEPs covering the standard(s) in
question, as well as the allocation of these royalties among holders of the
relevant SEPs. To make these determinations, the tribunal will likely be
required to consider issues of patent validity and essentiality.198 The
tribunal’s authority will not, however, extend to royalty rates for patents
that are not SEPs, making it important that SEP holders offer potential
product manufacturers an option to obtain a license that includes only
SEPs.199 By the same token, manufacturers should have the option to pay
royalties solely in cash at the determined rates, rather than through a
combination of cash payments, rebates, marketing allowances, crosslicensing offsets and the like.
Likewise, the FRAND Tribunal’s authority should not extend to the
adjudication of other claims between parties (e.g., breach of contract,
antitrust/competition law violations, patent misuse, fraud, inequitable
conduct and other forms of malfeasance). While international arbitrators

198. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1152–56 (evidence regarding patent validity and
essentiality should be considered). It is possible that an arbitrator’s consideration of the validity and
infringement of SEPs in determining a FRAND royalty rate might not require an individual
determination of the validity and infringement of every patent under consideration, but could be
assessed on a statistical or aggregate basis.
199. Some SEP holders—Qualcomm in particular—have in the past been reported to require
manufacturers to license both SEPs and non-SEPs as a package, with no option to license SEPs alone.
See, e.g., Lewis Ho & Monique Lee, Qualcomm Transforms SEP-Licensing Landscape in China,
LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/638183/qualcomm-transforms-seplicensing-landscape-in-china (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). This practice was among those condemned
by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2015, resulting in a $975
million fine against Qualcomm and an order requiring it to reform its licensing practices. Id. Recent
testimony suggests that Qualcomm now offers a SEP-only licensing option to manufacturers. See
Dorothy Atkins, Qualcomm Exec Says Google, FTC Deal Was Royalties Model, LAW360 (Jan. 18,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1120159/qualcomm-exec-says-google-ftc-deal-wasroyalties-model (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). According to a Qualcomm official, Qualcomm “generally
charges a 5 percent royalty fee for its entire patent portfolio, a 3.35 percent fee for only its SEPs and
a 2.275 percent fee for SEPs covering single-mode cellular technology.” Id.
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are generally recognized as competent to adjudicate such issues under the
New York Convention,200 the introduction of non-rate disputes to the
FRAND Tribunal’s scope of activity has the potential to distract from the
complex job of determining FRAND royalty rates and to burden
proceedings with time- and resource-consuming matters that could delay
rate determinations. Thus, it is recommended that all non-rate claims
should remain subject to adjudication in any court having jurisdiction over
the parties and that such court look to the FRAND Tribunal solely for the
rates established as FRAND.
Though most recent disputes regarding FRAND licenses have involved
the determination of royalty rates, many non-royalty terms and conditions
are included in the license agreements between SEP holders and
manufacturers (e.g., reciprocity, grant-backs, defensive suspension,
transfer of obligations, term, termination, etc.).201 In some cases,
arbitrators and courts actively dictate these non-royalty terms.202
However, this Article recommends that the FRAND Tribunal limit its
findings solely to FRAND royalty rates and that disputes regarding other
license agreement terms and their breach be decided through other
adjudicatory mechanisms. This narrow and exclusive focus on FRAND
royalty rates is critical, as the FRAND Tribunal, unlike an ordinary
arbitrator, will consider the entire panoply of patents covering a particular
standard held by multiple patent holders, rather than a particular licensing
transaction between a single patent holder and manufacturer.
D.

Tribunal Procedure

A FRAND Tribunal proceeding will be initiated when any SDO
participant petitions the Tribunal for a FRAND rate determination with
respect to a standard promulgated (or under development) by a
participating SDO. In making its determinations, the FRAND Tribunal
will consider evidence from all interested parties, including SEP holders,

200. See generally BORN, supra note 120, at 6.
201. See, e.g., COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
PATENT POLICY MANUAL 56–67 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) (discussing material terms of SEP
license agreements).
202. The FTC, in its Google/Motorola Order, required that Google commit to enter into license
agreements on “terms and conditions established by the arbitrator,” including terms and conditions
beyond the bare royalty rate. Google Order, supra note 124, at 10. Likewise, the U.K. court in
Unwired Planet appended a draft license agreement to its opinion in the case, requiring that the
implementer enter into an agreement on those precise terms. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei
Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 1304 [Attachment].
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implementers, and representatives of the SDO.203 SDO participants will
agree to provide the tribunal with all reasonable information concerning
their SEPs covering a standard under review, including licensing terms
offered to other parties (which will be disclosed confidentially to the
tribunal and not shared with other SDO participants except on an
aggregated basis). Like the Copyright Royalty Board, the tribunal may
choose to admit hearsay evidence and allow limited discovery.204
Given historical evidence of over-declaration of SEPs at major
SDOs,205 the FRAND Tribunal will be authorized to consider the
essentiality of patents to the standards in question. However, a patent-bypatent analysis, particularly when hundreds or thousands of patents are at
issue, would be impractical. Thus, it is advisable that an essentiality
analysis be conducted only in response to a party’s presentation of some
evidence that a particular patent or patents is not essential to the standard
in question. That is, there should be a rebuttable presumption that declared
SEPs are essential to the standard. However, if a SEP holder is found to
have declared non-essential patents as SEPs, the FRAND Tribunal should
also be authorized to impose reasonable penalties, such as reducing the
SEP holder’s apportioned share for those of its patents that are found to
be SEPs.206
The FRAND Tribunal should aim to resolve all matters as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within twelve months of initiation.
While aggressive, this timing is feasible if all parties cooperate with the
tribunal’s requests and discovery is limited.207 Unlike a court, the FRAND
Tribunal panel in any given case will not have a docket of other matters
to contend with, enabling it to devote substantial attention to the matter at
hand.

203. There is ample precedent for such multi-party proceedings—in the context of copyright ratesetting, for example. See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27 (discussing multi-party interpleader
proceedings in a range of contexts); Strickler, supra note 166.
204. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv) (2018) (Copyright Royalty Board - admissible evidence
and discovery).
205. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
206. See Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17, at 82–83 (proposing apportionment penalty for
over-declaration).
207. It is worth noting that proceedings concerning patent infringement at the International Trade
Commission are generally resolved in a speedier manner than district court litigation. See Rodney R.
Sweetland III & Michael McManus, Discovery Is Swift and Expansive at the ITC, EXEC. COUNS., Jan.
2012, at 25, https://issuu.com/todaysgc/docs/executive_counsel_decjan12 (last visited Apr. 18,
2019).
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The FRAND Tribunal’s formal procedures208 will be developed in
compliance with the requirements of the New York Convention209 so as
to be binding and enforceable in all Convention signatory states. This
feature of the FRAND Tribunal is critical, as recognition of its
determinations under the New York Convention obviates the need for
independent national rate-setting proceedings, thus eliminating the
inconsistency that arises when multiple adjudicatory bodies address the
same issues using different methodological approaches. Herein lies a
significant advantage of situating the tribunal within a recognized
international arbitral body that has already developed a baseline set of
procedural rules and practices that are consistent with the requirements of
the Convention.
E.

Stay of Injunctive Relief

The question whether a SEP holder is legally permitted to seek
injunctive relief against a potential licensee to whom it owes a FRAND
commitment has been debated extensively by commentators,
governmental agencies, and courts.210 Arguments have been made both
for and against the availability of such injunctions under equitable
remedies law, antitrust and competition law, and basic economic
principles.211 At most, it can safely be said that a FRAND commitment
208. For example, time, location and language of proceedings, rules surrounding timing of
discovery, length and format of written submissions, oral arguments, etc.
209. See New York Convention, supra note 123, art. II, V (requirements for enforceability of
arbitral awards).
210. For an overview of this debate and the current state of the law in various countries, see
Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1, at 24–29; Jorge L. Contreras et al., The Effect of
FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS:
TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, ch. 5 (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., forthcoming 2019); Pierre
Larouche & Nicolo Zingales, Injunctive Relief in the EU – Intellectual Property and Competition Law
at the Remedies Stage, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 25; J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive
Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6,
ch. 24.
211. Some litigants have argued that a SEP holder, by making a FRAND commitment, implicitly
agrees not to exclude others from the market, but instead agrees to collect only a reasonable royalty
for the use of its SEPs. As a result, it has been argued in the United Stats that a SEP holder should
automatically be barred from seeking injunctive relief under the U.S. Supreme Court’s four-part test
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Considering this issue in Apple v.
Motorola, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)the Federal Circuit held that while there should not be a per
se rule prohibiting the holder of a SEP from seeking an injunction, a SEP holder could have difficulty
showing “irreparable harm” under the eBay test if it has previously made a FRAND commitment. Id.
at 1332. Further complicating matters, there are signs that the U.S. DOJ may now have a different
view regarding injunctions and FRAND-encumbered SEPs. In a recent speech, the head of the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division was critical of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple v. Motorola and expressed
skepticism about the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney
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limits a SEP holder’s ability to seek injunctive relief against an infringing
product manufacturer, so long as that manufacturer is willing to accept a
license on FRAND terms.212 The precise contours and conditions of that
limitation are dependent, however, on a variety of factors that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and which have evolved over time.
One thing that is relatively clear, however, is the ability of parties
voluntarily to waive their rights to seek injunctive relief through private
mechanisms. Recently, such waivers have featured prominently in the
standard-setting context. In 2012 and 2013, several large technology firms
voluntarily committed not to seek injunctions under SEPs in connection
with Department of Justice approval of their patent-related acquisitions.213
And in 2015, the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA), a major SDO,
approved an amendment to its patent policy that required its members to
forego injunctive relief against manufacturers of products implementing
IEEE standards except under certain limited circumstances.214
This Article recommends that SDOs impose a moratorium on
injunctive relief during the pendency of FRAND rate-setting proceedings,
specifically those that are mandatory, but possibly optional proceedings

Gen., Remarks at the U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. for Transnational Law & Bus. (Nov. 10, 2017)
(transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-makandelrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center [https://perma.cc/SV4T-Z8P6]); Ryan
Davis, Antitrust Chief’s SEP Injunction Speech Puts Focus on Courts, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1111832/antitrust-chief-s-sep-injunction-speech-puts-focus-oncourts (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).
The analytical framework in Europe for assessing whether the enforcement of a FRANDencumbered SEP constitutes an abuse of dominance was established by the European Court of Justice
(CJEU) in Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=1&part=1&mode=lst&docid=165911&oc
c=first&dir=&cid=3858 [https://perma.cc/J8HR-GP5Q]. In Huawei, the SEP holder sought an
injunction against the implementer of a standard. Id. at ¶ 27. The CJEU held that if a SEP holder
possesses market dominance, then in order to avoid violating Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the SEP holder must comply with a series of procedural
steps. Id. at ¶ 71. Likewise, in order to preserve its ability to challenge the SEP holder’s seeking an
injunction, the infringer must comply with a similar set of procedural steps. Id. The combination of
these behavioral requirements has been referred to as the Huawei “choreography”. Since the Huawei
decision, a number of cases in Germany and other EU member states have sought to interpret these
requirements with mixed success. See ROBIN JACOB & ALEXANDER MILNER, 4IP COUNCIL, LESSONS
FROM HUAWEI V. ZTE 10 (2016), http://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-research-4ip-councillessons-huawei-v-zte [https://perma.cc/B9C5-E78V].
212. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332; FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 235 (2011).
213. See Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1 (discussing commitments made by
Apple, Microsoft and Motorola to refrain from seeking injunctive relief against infringers of SEPs).
214. See IEEE Policy, supra note 15; Harri Kalimo et al., supra note 142, at 155 (discussing
proposed ETSI “balanced safe harbour” approach).
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as well.215 Doing so will reduce potential disruptions to the market while
the financial terms of required FRAND licenses are determined. It will
also eliminate a significant potential threat that SEP holders could assert
against product manufacturers to distort the testimony and evidence
brought forward at rate-setting proceedings. This prohibition on seeking
injunctive relief would not, however, be permanent. Once FRAND royalty
rates are determined for a specific standard, a SEP holder will be permitted
to pursue injunctions against product manufacturers that refuse to accept
an otherwise fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory license at the
designated rate within a reasonable period of time.216
F.

Tribunal Determinations

The FRAND Tribunal will base its decisions on evidence and briefing
presented by the parties, as well as its own investigation of applicable law
and relevant SDO policies. If the legal rules governing a particular SDO
policy are not within the competency of the Tribunal members (e.g., U.S.
members of the Tribunal may not be versed in French law, which governs
ETSI’s policies),217 then reliable testimony regarding the relevant laws
should be obtained through unbiased expert testimony.218 In some cases,
extrinsic evidence regarding accepted interpretations of otherwise
ambiguous or incomplete SDO policy language may be necessary, and the
Tribunal should be authorized to seek such evidence through testimony of
reliable witnesses.219

215. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1142–43 (“SSOs should explicitly state in their IP
policies that a patent holder making a FRAND commitment has given up its right to seek an injunction
against any willing licensee for infringement of its standard-essential patents.”).
216. A useful guide for determining when a potential licensee is not acting in good faith may be
the line of cases deriving from the European Court of Justice decision in Case C-170/13, Huawei
(providing guidelines for assessing whether SEP holder’s seeking of injunctive relief constitutes
violation of EU competition law, dependent in part on conduct of the potential licensee). See JACOB
& MILNER, supra note 211; Larouche & Zingales, supra note 210; Nicolas Petit, EU Competition
Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 17.
217. See Contreras, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 26, ¶ 18 (describing application of French law in
U.S. and U.K. cases involving ETSI standards).
218. See, e.g., Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts:
Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2011)
(describing how U.S. courts can and should gain understanding of foreign laws that they are required
to apply).
219. It is not uncommon for courts to seek witness testimony to discern the intent of unclear or
incomplete SDO policy language. See Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The
Legal Framework Governing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 219 (2017)
(SDO policy interpretation informed by participant testimony in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG,
318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir.
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Following the model of the CRB, the FRAND Tribunal will make
decisions by majority vote, with any dissenting views specifically set forth
in the tribunal’s written opinion.220 The FRAND Tribunal’s sole charge
will be to determine a top-down, aggregate FRAND royalty rate
applicable to the standard in question and establish an allocation of the
resulting royalties among the different holders of SEPs covering that
standard.221 The FRAND Tribunal will be empowered to utilize any
reasonable methodology to determine such rates. While, as noted in
Section I.A above, courts that have adopted top-down royalty calculation
methodologies to date have relied on data that can be characterized as
incomplete, imprecise, and self-serving,222 more sophisticated analytical
methods are available and have been used in non-litigation contexts.223
FRAND rates may be structured by the Tribunal according to any
reasonable rate schedule (including rates that vary by country, are
volume-based, and which vary by tier in the distribution chain), subject to
any particular limitations of the relevant SDO rules.
The allocation of any aggregate (top-down) royalty established for a
particular standard will be presumed to be divided among individual SEPs
on a numerical proportionality basis (i.e., one patent, one share) unless the
evidence strongly suggests that particular SEPs are deserving of a greater
or lesser share.224 It will be up to the FRAND Tribunal to evaluate such
evidence and devise an appropriate allocation methodology.
Unlike arbitral and rate-setting bodies established under national law,
decisions of the FRAND Tribunal will not normally be subject to judicial
oversight or review.225 The only challenges to tribunal decisions will be
those judicial challenges permitted to be made to any arbitral decision
under the New York Convention—i.e., on grounds of bias, contradiction

2008)); Contreras, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 26, at 262–63 (proposing the codification of a set of
common understandings relating to SDO policies).
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(3) (2018) (Copyright Royalty Board makes decisions by majority
vote).
221. See supra Section I.A.2 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
223. See Independent Economic Study Suggests HEVC Royalties Should be Comparable to or Less
than
Rates
for
AVC,
UNIFIED
PATENTS
(Jan.
9,
2019),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2019/1/9/independent-economic-study-suggests-hevcroyalties-should-be-comparable-to-or-less-than-rates-for-avc [https://perma.cc/9FCN-CYMY].
224. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1151 (FRAND royalties need not be determined on
a patent-by-patent basis).
225. For example, royalty rate decisions of the Copyright Royalty Board are subject to appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1).
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of law and public policy.226 Otherwise, the only recourse when parties
disagree with the FRAND Tribunal’s decisions is for the relevant SDO to
revise its policies so as to remove reliance on the FRAND Tribunal in
future disputes.
Importantly, the FRAND Tribunal will have no enforcement or
collection authority. It will merely determine FRAND rates as set forth
above. In the event of non-payment, the relevant parties will be entitled to
seek appropriate administrative or legal remedies.
G.

Public Disclosure

As noted above, arbitration proceedings are conducted privately and all
parties, including the arbitrators, are required to maintain the
confidentiality of the evidence presented, the parties’ arguments, and the
arbitral award.227 The proceedings of the FRAND Tribunal, however,
should be different. Its determinations, reasoning, and methodology
should be made publicly available in the interest of transparency and
fostering consistency of future decisions.
It is particularly important that the FRAND Tribunal explain its
reasoning in a detailed written opinion that clearly enunciates any
dissenting views. Reasoned decisions are valuable, as they inform the
parties of the grounds on which the tribunal’s rulings are based. Moreover,
an unreasoned arbitral award is more vulnerable to subsequent judicial
challenge on grounds of public policy.228 As in judicial proceedings,
certain highly confidential materials may be placed under protective order
and excluded from the public record.229
Several positive effects are likely to arise from the public disclosure of
the FRAND Tribunal’s proceedings. As numerous commentators have
noted, it is notoriously difficult to determine, or even estimate, a FRAND
royalty rate when the license agreements and settlements relating to the
relevant SEPs are confidential.230 Opening the results of FRAND rate226. See BORN, supra note 120, at 795–96.
227. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
228. See BORN, supra note 120, at 832 cmt. 16 (unreasoned awards are vulnerable to revocation by
courts based on public policy grounds); id. at 918 (unreasoned awards are less likely to be given
collateral estoppel effect if re-litigated).
229. For example, certain documents, such as license agreements covering both SEPs and other
intellectual property rights and non-standardized technologies, may have legitimate claims to some
degree of confidentiality. It should be up to the tribunal to fashion reasonable rules regarding the
protection of confidential information adduced during its proceedings.
230. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 22, at 40; Gilbert, supra note 14, at 870; Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145; Patterson, supra note 21, at 864.
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setting proceedings to the public would begin to establish a base of
information relating to SEP royalties that could begin to eliminate the
uncertainty that currently exists in the market.231 Such improved
transparency could help parties to negotiate more appropriate FRAND
licenses and make verification of SEP holders’ compliance with the nondiscrimination prong of the FRAND requirement easier.
H.

Antitrust and Competition Considerations

As noted above, some SDOs have historically been wary of
participating in or facilitating the discussion of patent royalty rates or
other commercial issues pertaining to products implementing their
standards.232 These concerns have been fueled largely by fear of potential
liability under antitrust and competition law. Specifically, it has been
suggested that an SDO may act as a vehicle for product manufacturers to
exert oligopsonistic anticompetitive pressure against a SEP holder,
potentially depressing royalty rates below reasonable levels and even to
zero.233 Another objection is based on the potential chilling effect that
such concerted action could have on innovation around standardized
technologies.234 These concerns have been rekindled recently by officials
at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, who have indicated
that renewed scrutiny may be applied to collusive behavior within
SDOs.235 While numerous commentators, including the author, have
attempted to assuage these concerns,236 Pierre Régibeau and collaborators
231. For similar reasons, Lemley and Shapiro propose that arbitration decisions be disclosed to
“willing licensees.” Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145–46 (“[S]ecrecy would undermine the
effectiveness of the FRAND regime.”).
232. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (discussing SDO policies against intervening
in FRAND licensing or interpretation).
233. J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 126, 142–51 (2009) (“[E]x ante collective action
that is privately undertaken in an [SDO] to counteract potential patent holdup may facilitate, if not
serve as an outright façade for, horizontal price fixing by oligopsonists of the patented input.”).
234. Farrell et al., supra note 93, at 632 (“The potential danger . . . is that by negotiating as a group,
technology users could extract such favorable terms from patent holders (another form of hold-up)
that they will inefficiently discourage future innovation.”).
235. See Jorge L. Contreras, Essay, Taking It to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Toward
Standards
Development,
103
MINN.
L.
REV.
HEADNOTES
66
(2018),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Contreras_1fmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NQH-DVSG].
236. See, e.g., Contreras, Aggregated Royalties, supra note 17, at 705 (“Like the holders of pooled
patents, SDO participants can achieve efficiencies and other procompetitive benefits by coordinating
the aggregate rates at which SEPs covering a standard are licensed.”); Farrell et al., supra note 93, at
635 (suggesting that one beneficial approach “would be to permit members of an SSO collectively to
negotiate royalties with patent holders, so long as membership in the SSO does not preclude any
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may be correct in their observation that “part of the antitrust community
still has an almost instinctive allergy to the idea of rivals setting prices
together.”237
The proposed FRAND Tribunal addresses these concerns by removing
any price determination or negotiation activity from the SDO or its
participants and placing rate-setting authority in the hands of an
independent arbitral body. Moreover, the proposed public disclosure of
FRAND Tribunal deliberations and decisions is likely to fit more
comfortably within existing antitrust rules than the secrecy that currently
pervades this market.238 As a result, the proposed rate-setting mechanism,
like any judicial or arbitration procedure, should remain less subject to
antitrust and competition law concerns than private negotiation of
FRAND royalty rates.
I.

Tradeoffs: Precision Versus Efficiency

Admittedly, there are tradeoffs involved when non-judicial dispute
resolution mechanisms are used in lieu of litigation. In general, the
arbitration of commercial disputes has been criticized due to the
unavailability of appellate review of decisions: if an arbitrator makes a
mistake, it is often difficult or impossible to correct.239 As the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted in 1994, “[a]rbitration provides
neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper
application of substantive law offered by the judicial system.”240 For these

individual firm, or group of firms acting in concert, from producing competing products that do not
comply with the standard”); Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“This joint action is acceptable for society
because it trades off possible technology competition among SSO members for production of a
standard that can speed innovation and expand output.”); Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra
note 65, at 2043–44 (stating that collective negotiation of SEP royalty rates is “very likely to be
procompetitive if the technology would otherwise be so encumbered by patent rights and blocking
positions that the standard would have difficulty moving forward in the market”); Lemley, Ten
Things, supra note 43, at 161 (“[T]he law ought to permit SSO members the latitude to discuss royalty
rates collectively before the standard is set.”); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its
Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727,
735 (2005) (noting that joint negotiation may improve the “quality of decision making” within an
SDO and “increase[] the prospects for achieving a procompetitive ‘open’ standards outcome”).
237. RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 45.
238. See Patterson, supra note 21 (raising antitrust concerns arising from lack of transparency in
FRAND licensing transactions).
239. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 196, at 455 (“Just as a trial court’s decision may be
erroneous, so might an arbitrator’s award. But it is far more likely that a trial court’s erroneous
ruling will be overturned on appeal than an arbitrator’s erroneous ruling will be vacated by a
court.”); Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 122, at 340.
240. Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994).

07 - Contreras (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

6/18/2019 7:58 PM

754

[Vol. 94:701

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

reasons, firms may feel that arbitration of disputes is risky, particularly in
the case of “bet the company” litigation.241 One well-known study of
arbitration clauses in public company contracts found that only eleven
percent of all business-to-business contracts (and thirty-three percent of
licensing agreements) included arbitration clauses.242
Additionally, the FRAND Tribunal could face issues similar to those
faced in bilateral arbitration. Specifically, the proposed rate-setting
mechanism may not result in awards to individual patent holders that are
equivalent to what they might receive in national litigation or in private
negotiations.243 Moreover, it is not expected that the allocations
determined by the FRAND Tribunal will precisely account for the value
of each patent held in a particular firm’s portfolio, nor does the tribunal
format allow for appeal of results that are not to the liking of a particular
party.
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that a high degree of precision
is neither expected nor delivered in the private bilateral negotiations that
result in FRAND licenses today, where portfolios of hundreds or
thousands of patents are licensed for a simple percentage royalty rate.
Given the large number of patents and patent holders participating in
many of today’s most critical industry standards, precise compensation on
a patent-by-patent basis is not a realistic expectation nor a necessary
condition to the functioning of the market. Rather, in order for the
marketplace to operate efficiently and to enable the broadest
dissemination of standardized technology around the world, the proposal
set forth in this Article aspires to produce, in the words of the Internet
standards body IETF, “rough consensus and running code.”244 Thus, it is
hoped that a small sacrifice in terms of precision will achieve larger gains
in terms of overall efficiency, predictability, and market stability.

241. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 196, at 455 (quoting Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2008)).
242. Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 122, at 351, tbl.2.
243. Moreover, rates set by a FRAND Tribunal could effectively act as a ceiling on rates privately
negotiated by parties, much as the compulsory mechanical copyright royalty rates set by the CRB
have become ceilings on the amounts that can be charged for mechanical music licenses. See Howard
B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 235
(2009) (“The statutory royalty rate has become a ceiling rather than a floor for the earnings of music
publishers and their composers and lyricists from recordings.”).
244. Dave Clark, A Cloudy Crystal Ball - Visions of the Future, Presentation at the Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fourth Internet Engineering Task Force, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 543, slide 19 (Megan Davies et al. eds., 1992),
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/24.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
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Navigating the Political Economy of Standard-Setting

Despite any overall welfare-enhancing benefits of the proposed
FRAND Tribunal, one may legitimately ask why individual SDOs and
SDO participants, each acting in its own fiscal best interest, would ever
consent to such a system. SEP holders seemingly prefer the status quo, in
which FRAND rates are largely determined in secret bilateral negotiations
with product manufacturers and only occasionally reach a judicial
determination.245 Large manufacturers may prefer to take their chances in
the national courts, particularly if local rules are perceived to favor their
positions. And SDOs, which are ultimately dues-driven membership
organizations, may be reluctant to adopt policy changes that are perceived
to be detrimental to particular member interests, due to both the effort and
resource commitment required to such amendments approved and the
potential loss of members who opposed the policy change.246
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the proposed FRAND
Tribunal may find support where other proposals to reform the FRAND
system have not. First, the cost of litigating complex patents and economic
theories across multiple jurisdictions is significant, even for the largest
firms.247 The proposed FRAND Tribunal is likely to reduce the cost of
dispute resolution for all parties involved, not to mention freeing valuable
time currently spent by corporate executives and engineers on litigation.
Second, litigation over FRAND commitments often brings with it a
number of ancillary claims that can have serious repercussions for firms,
including claims sounding in fraud, unfair business practices, and
violations of antitrust and competition law.248 Resolving disagreements
over FRAND royalty rates through non-judicial rate-setting could reduce

245. Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36, at 206–07 (describing self-interested opposition to SDO
transparency measures by patent-centric firms).
246. See id. at 174–77 (discussing member opposition to SDO policy amendments at VITA, ETSI,
and IEEE); supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of 2015 IEEE policy
amendments).
247. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 905, 932 n.107 (“[M]y estimate based on conversations with people close to the cases
is that the parties in the ongoing smartphone litigation have already spent at least $1 billion in legal
fees, and the cases are far from over.”); Susan Deckeret et al., Apple, Samsung Declare Peace in
Biggest Modern Tech Patent Fight, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018, 3:29 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-27/apple-samsung-settle-patent-infringementdispute (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (“litigation cost each company hundreds of millions of dollars in
legal fees.”).
248. See Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys.,
773 F.3d 1201, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2014); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktenbologet
LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-00341 JVS, 2016 WL 4150033, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016).
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or eliminate the risk of these ancillary but serious claims. That is, even
though such ancillary claims could, in theory, result in a series of costly
and time-consuming national actions, it is likely that the resolution of the
principal issue at the core of these disputes—the FRAND royalty rate—
will dissuade parties from pursuing these ancillary claims further.
Finally, parties in FRAND-related litigation have routinely sought to
enlist the assistance of antitrust and competition enforcement agencies in
advancing their causes, leading to numerous agency investigations, legal
actions, and penalties against major market participants.249 Resolving
FRAND rate disputes early through a FRAND Tribunal would lessen the
incentive of parties to draw the conduct of their negotiation adversaries to
the attention of governmental officials and would thus reduce the
likelihood of governmental intervention in these markets—a desirable
outcome for many firms.250
CONCLUSION
The commitment to license patents that are essential to technical
interoperability standards on FRAND terms is intended to foster the rapid
development and broad adoption of standards necessary to the modern
technological infrastructure. Yet disputes over FRAND royalty rates
continue to bedevil participants in global technology markets, leading to
increased litigation and progressively inconsistent results from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Moreover, the lack of transparency in current
licensing transactions, coupled with the narrow focus of adjudicators on
individual parties rather than the totality of rights associated with a
particular standard, has added further uncertainty and instability to the
FRAND licensing system. Any proposal to reform the FRAND licensing
system must thus address three key aspects that are currently lacking in
the system: transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness.
This Article proposes the establishment of a global FRAND rate-setting
tribunal designed to reduce negotiation, litigation, and other excess
transaction costs while achieving a fair allocation of resources among
affected stakeholders. It does so through a mechanism that seeks, to the
greatest extent possible, to achieve the tripartite goals of transparency,
consistency, and comprehensiveness. Specifically, it calls for the
establishment of an international, non-governmental FRAND Tribunal
and the modification of SDO policies either to mandate or make available
249. See, e.g., Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1, at 5–13 (describing governmental
investigations of and actions against Google/Motorola, Samsung, Qualcomm, and others).
250. This is not to say, of course, that governmental agencies should not maintain their vigilance
and continue to bring appropriate enforcement actions to curb anticompetitive behavior.
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the resolution of FRAND royalty disputes through this mechanism. Like
existing rate-setting bodies such as the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board, the
FRAND Tribunal will collect all available evidence regarding the
patented and unpatented technology involved in a particular standard,
determine an aggregate (top-down) royalty rate for the standard as a
whole, and appropriately apportion royalties among all holders of
essential patents. Beyond these rate-setting matters, the FRAND Tribunal
will adjudicate no other issues, and related claims for breach of contract
and antitrust and competition law violations would continue to be subject
to adjudication by any court(s) having jurisdiction. SDO participants
would be required to refrain from seeking injunctive relief against
potential licensees during the pendency of rate-setting proceedings, but
once FRAND royalty rates are determined for a specific standard, a patent
holder will be permitted to pursue injunctions against product
manufacturers that refuse to accept a license at the designated rate.
Though the proposed rate-setting mechanism will not result in awards
to individual patent holders that precisely account for the value of each
patent, this degree of precision is neither a realistic expectation nor a
necessary condition to the functioning of the market. Rather, it is hoped
that the proposed FRAND Tribunal will make the FRAND licensing
marketplace operate more efficiently by eliminating excessive transaction
costs and enabling broad dissemination of standardized technology
around the world, while still achieving a fair distribution of proceeds
among affected stakeholders. While further details regarding the
implementation and operation of the FRAND Tribunal must be
considered and debated, the general approach outlined in this Article has
the potential to bring greater predictability and stability to the technology
development ecosystem while reducing costly and disruptive litigation.

